Mewtee, 4157 Ranaka Street, Randfontein (2026)

26/12/2025

Rift Valley fever: what it is, how it spreads and how to stop it

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is a viral disease transmitted by mosquitoes that mainly affects livestock. It can also infect humans. While most human cases remain mild, it can cause death. The disease causes heavy economic and health losses for livestock farmers.

As a researcher, I have contributed to several studies on this mosquito-borne virus.

So, what exactly is Rift Valley fever, how it is treated, and how it can be controlled?

What is Rift Valley fever?
Rift Valley fever is a zoonosis (a disease affecting animals that can be transmitted to humans). It is caused by the RVF virus, a phlebovirus from the Phenuiviridae family (order Bunyavirales). The disease primarily affects domestic animals, mainly cattle, sheep and goats, but also camelids and other small ruminants. It can occasionally infect humans.

In animals, the disease causes high morbidity: reduced milk production, high newborn mortality, mass abortions in pregnant females, and death in 10% to 20% of cases. This leads to serious economic losses for farmers.

Most people who get Rift Valley fever have no symptoms or just flu-like syndrome. But in a few people, it can become very serious, causing complications such as eye disorders, meningoencephalitis (inflammation of the brain), or hemorrhagic fever. The fatality rate among infected people is around 1%.

How it’s transmitted
In animals, the disease is mainly spread through bites from infected mosquitoes. At least 50 mosquito species can transmit the Rift Valley fever virus, including Aedes, Culex, Anopheles and Mansonia species. Mosquitoes become infected when they feed on animals carrying the virus in their blood, then transmit it to other animals through their bites. In Aedes mosquitoes, vertical transmission – from infected females to their eggs – is also possible, allowing the virus to survive in the environment.

For humans, the most common way to get infected is through direct contact with the blood or organs of an infected animal. This often happens during veterinary work, slaughtering, or butchering.

While it is also possible for human to get the virus from a mosquito bite, this is not common. No human-to-human transmission has been observed to date.

The origins and spread
A serious outbreak of Rift Valley fever began to be reported in Senegal in late September 2025. The west African country has been battling to control it.

The disease was first discovered in 1931 in the Rift Valley in Kenya in east Africa, during a human epidemic of 200 cases. The virus itself was isolated and identified in 1944 in neighbouring Uganda.

Since then, numerous outbreaks of the disease have been reported in Africa: in Egypt (1977), Madagascar (1990, 2021), Kenya (1997, 1998), in Somalia (1998), in Tanzania (1998), the Comoros (2007-2008) and Mayotte (2018-2019).

In west Africa, the main epidemics affected Mauritania (1987, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2010, 2012), Senegal (1987, 2013-2014) and Niger (2016).

Its spread into the Sahel and west African regions has been largely driven by the movement of livestock, and by environmental factors.

To date, around 30 countries have reported animal and/or human cases in the form of outbreaks or epidemics.

Why and how outbreaks occur
Rift Valley fever reemerges in cyclical patterns, with major outbreaks occurring in Africa every five to 15 years. The trigger for these outbreaks is closely linked to specific environmental conditions, like periods of heavy rainfall that create ideal breeding conditions for mosquitoes.

In east Africa, epidemics typically follow periods of exceptionally heavy rainfall or flooding in normally dry regions. For instance, the severe outbreaks of 1998-1999 were directly linked to intense rains caused by the El Niño climate phenomenon.

In the Sahel region, the relationship with rainfall is less predictable. Outbreaks can appear in unexpected, poorly monitored areas, and genetic analysis of viruses in Mauritania suggests that new strains can be introduced directly from other regions.

A key mystery is how the virus persists in the environment between these major outbreaks. It is believed to survive in the environment within a “wild reservoir” of animals – such as certain antelopes, deer, and possibly even reptiles – though this reservoir has not yet been fully identified.

Once an initial outbreak occurs, the virus can spread to new areas. This happens through the movement of infected livestock, the accidental transport of infected mosquitoes (for example, in vehicles or cargo), and when environmental conditions are conducive.

Clinical symptoms and treatments
Adult cattle and sheep may show nasal discharge, excessive salivation, loss of appetite, weakness, diarrhoea.

In humans, after an incubation period of two to six days, most infections are asymptomatic or mild, with flu-like symptoms lasting four to seven days. People who recover from the infection typically gain natural immunity.

However, in a small percentage of individuals, the disease can take a severe turn:

Eye lesions affect up to 10% of symptomatic cases. They appear one to three weeks after initial symptoms and can heal on their own or lead to permanent blindness.

Meningoencephalitis (inflammation of the brain and meninges) occurs in 2%-4% of symptomatic cases, one to four weeks after symptom onset. Mortality is low, but neurological after-effects are common.

Hemorrhagic fever (diseases that cause fever and bleeding due to damage to the blood vessels) occurs in less than 1% of symptomatic cases, usually two to four days after symptoms begin. About half of these patients die within three to six days.

There is no specific treatment for severe cases of Rift Valley fever in humans.

Surveillance, prevention and control
Veterinary surveillance with immediate reporting and monitoring of infection in animals is essential to control the disease. During outbreaks, controlled culling of infected animals and strict restrictions on the movement of livestock are the most effective ways to slow virus spread.

As with all mosquito-borne viral diseases, controlling vector populations is an effective preventive measure, though it is challenging, especially in rural areas.

To prevent new outbreaks, animals in endemic regions can be vaccinated in advance. A modified live virus vaccine provides long-term immunity after a single dose, but it is not recommended for pregnant females because it can cause abortions. An inactivated virus vaccine is also available, it avoids these side effects, but it requires several doses to provide adequate protection.

Threat, vulnerabilities and health risks
People at highest risk of infection include livestock farmers, abattoir workers and veterinarians. An inactivated vaccine for human has been developed. But it is not licensed yet and has only been used experimentally.

Raising awareness of risk factors is the only effective way to reduce human infections during outbreaks. Key risk factors include:

handling sick animals or their tissues during farming and slaughter

consuming fresh blood, raw milk, or meat

mosquito bites.

It is important to follow basic health precautions when Rift Valley fever appears. Wash your hands regularly. Wear protective gear when handling animals or during slaughter. Always cook animal products such as blood, meat and milk thoroughly. Use mosquito nets or repellents consistently.

Author
Marc Souris
chercheur, Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD)

Disclosure statement
Marc Souris receives funding from ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche, France) and IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le développement).

25/12/2025

When kids move overseas: why visits are so rare for South Africa’s emigrant families

More than one million South Africans, about 1.6% of the country’s population of 63 million, currently live overseas. Emigration is never a solitary event or a purely economic decision. When one person leaves, an entire network of relationships is reshaped. This means that parents, grandparents, siblings and friends are left behind, making it challenging to maintain close bonds across continents.

Despite vast geographical distances and the challenges of differing time zones, the enduring parent–child bond motivates families to seek meaningful ways to stay connected. Among the most powerful of these are transnational visits. For those who can travel, these visits serve as an emotional and relational lifeline: they allow parents to step into their adult children’s newly formed worlds, observe their daily routines, and build or maintain bonds with grandchildren born or raised abroad.

Although families stay connected through technology, parents emphasise that virtual contact cannot replace the desire for in-person connection. Yet this longing is often unmet. For many families, visiting is a deeply felt desire rather than a realistic possibility.

In a recent research paper I examined barriers to transnational visits from South African parents to their emigrant children. It intentionally centres on the experiences of parents travelling abroad, rather than on return visits to South Africa.

In total, 37 participants took part. They were South African citizens from a range of racial, cultural and religious backgrounds. They were between 50 and 85 years old. They were fluent in English and were parents of adult child(ren) who had emigrated and lived abroad for at least one year.

Most participants were women. Their children had emigrated to a range of countries, including Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US. This aligns with global trends of South African emigration to English-speaking, economically developed countries.

The research uncovered the intertwined financial, emotional, physical, relational, and bureaucratic complexities that shape whether, how, and how often these visits take place.

Why visits matter
For transnational families, visits allow parents and children to revive and nurture attachments. They complement virtual interactions, video calls, instant messages and social media.

For parents, visiting their children’s homes bridges the gap between imagined spaces created through video calls and the lived realities of those environments. These experiences foster deeper emotional connections, enabling families to share closeness, engage in mutual care, and observe unspoken cues such as body language and tone, elements foundational to sustaining relationships.

Despite their importance, the rarity of transnational visits emerged clearly from participants’ narratives. While a small number of parents in the study were able to visit annually or every couple of years, this was the exception rather than the norm. For most, visits were rare events.

Although nearly all parents longed to visit more frequently, the majority had visited only once and several had never visited at all. Those who had visited spoke about long gaps between visits and the uncertainty of when or whether a next visit would ever be possible. This absence amplifies the loneliness experienced and leaves parents feeling increasingly “out of sync” with their children’s lives, at times even “irrelevant”.

Three main challenges
Parents consistently expressed a desire to visit more often. Yet this longing was constrained by the realities of their circumstances. Three major challenges emerged across the qualitative interviews.

Financial constraints: This was the most significant barrier, often preventing parents from realising their desire to visit their emigrant children. Air travel from South Africa to destinations such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US is expensive. The South African rand’s weak exchange rate against strong currencies turns even modest flights into luxury purchases.

Retirees living on fixed incomes often find themselves caught between safeguarding their financial stability and meeting the deep emotional need to reconnect with their children and grandchildren.

"It is terribly expensive. If I now had to, I would scratch the money out from somewhere and I can afford it, but I need to look after myself as well. Even if you have money, you don’t spend your money on something that is really absurd, like the price of air tickets at this stage is completely absurd."

Hidden expenses can also make visits even more challenging. Visa application fees, compulsory health insurance and medical examinations quickly add up.

Logistical strain: The geographical distance between South Africa and the popular emigration destinations such as Australia, the United States and New Zealand presents significant obstacles. For many elderly parents, long-haul travel is physically and mentally demanding.

As one participant shared:

"The trip to America … there’s a lot of jet lag, and it’s not an easy trip to make. You know, if your kids are in Europe or England, there’s no time delay, no jet lag or anything like that."

Chronic illnesses, mobility limitations and fatigue make these journeys even more challenging. For some parents, the physical toll makes travel unmanageable or medically inadvisible.

Practical considerations, especially how long to stay, long enough to make the trip worthwhile but not too long to disrupt routines, add another layer of complexity. These decisions make planning a visit both logistically and emotionally taxing.

The emotional weight of saying goodbye: Every visit carries an inevitable ending. With no certainty about when, or if, the next visit will happen, each departure feels like a potential final farewell, especially for older parents. The joy of togetherness becomes tinged with the dread of parting, a heaviness that grows as the end of the visit approaches. For many, the farewell at the end of a visit is one of the most emotionally difficult moments.

As a grandmother describes:

"And then a big factor is the sadness with the goodbye and for weeks after that you still struggle and can’t get back on track properly. For me, it gets more intense every time."

Some parents avoid visiting altogether because the emotional cost of departure outweighs the joy of being together.

Longing for presence
Many transnational parents must face the reality that limited financial, physical, or emotional resources will restrict the number of visits they can undertake in their lifetime. While digital communication helps families stay connected across borders, parents emphasised that virtual contact cannot recreate the intimacy that grows from in-person visits: the shared routines, playful moments and physical closeness.

Visits matter because they offer what digital technologies cannot fully provide: presence.

Author
Sulette Ferreira
Transnational Family Specialist and Researcher, University of Johannesburg

Disclosure statement
Sulette Ferreira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

24/12/2025

Who’s my dad? In South Africa that’s a complex question – report tracks the rise of ‘social fathers’

The State of South Africa’s Fathers 2024 report is published by the new Tataokhona project at Stellenbosch University. The project focuses on research and interventions related to fathers and fatherhood. This is the third edition of this report, and offers valuable insights into the evolving realities of fatherhood in South Africa. Co-authors Wessel van den Berg, Mandisa Malinga, Kopano Ratele and Tawanda Makusha explain why it’s critical to examine the changing role of men in families.

What were some of the key findings of the report?
The report presents data from the General Household Survey 2023 and a survey of adult caregivers in South Africa, also done in 2023.

One of the key findings is that 76% of children in South Africa live with an adult male in the household. This is often overlooked when the media and researchers focus on children’s co-residence with fathers.

However, fewer children live with their biological fathers than with other men. The percentage of children who live with their biological fathers has dropped from 45.3% in 1996 to 35% in 2023.

This decline is linked to broader societal factors, including economic instability, migration patterns, and shifts in traditional family structures.

Never have so few children been recorded as living with their biological fathers, nor have so many lived with other men like uncles, grandfathers, older brothers or mothers’ new partners.

As researchers, policymakers and other development practitioners, we need to explore the contribution men make in their families, biological or otherwise.

The case studies and contributions from authors across the country underscore that while physical presence is important, the quality of engagement between the father figure and child is even more crucial.

Encouraging positive father-child relationships through legal, workplace and social policy changes could help mitigate the known effects of not living together.

What did the survey reveal about who provides for children?
Traditionally, fatherhood has been closely linked to financial provision. However, economic hardships and shifting gender roles are reshaping this expectation.

Co-residence goes down as income goes down. Many fathers, particularly those facing unemployment or economic hardship, struggle to maintain active participation in their children’s lives.

Many fathers are also forced to migrate to find work.

Those men who cannot provide do not see any other role for themselves in children’s lives, and so they disengage.

Data from the State of the World’s Fathers 2023 survey showed that in South Africa 85% of women financially supported their biological children, compared to 80% of men. Most children are supported by both parents, but mothers bear a higher financial burden than fathers.

Women are also more likely than men to provide for non-biological children (50% vs 44%).

These figures highlight the growing financial responsibilities shouldered by women and the need to redefine fatherhood beyond economic provision.

The increasing financial burden on women also reveals deep-seated inequalities in wage distribution and employment opportunities.

Many fathers who wish to support their children financially face obstacles such as unemployment and precarious work conditions.

While some men have adapted by taking on caregiving roles, society still puts pressure on them to prioritise financial contribution over direct caregiving.

This paradox creates stress and identity struggles for many fathers. It reinforces the need for supportive policies like paid parental leave and father-focused caregiving initiatives.

What does the survey tell us about ‘social fathers’?
With only a minority of children living with their biological fathers, social fathers – men who provide care despite not being biologically related to the child – have become increasingly significant. The State of the World’s Fathers 2023 survey found for example that of the men who care for children whom they had not biologically fathered, 51.1% of the men played with the children, 50.2% provided financial support, and 40.2% read books with them.

The report emphasises that 40% of children reside with men who are not their biological fathers, a trend that has grown since 1996. We believe these men can and should be encouraged to step into the role of social fathers. They include grandfathers, uncles, stepfathers, teachers and community leaders who contribute to children’s emotional and material well-being.

However, social fathers lack legal recognition and support in South Africa. This makes it harder for them to access resources that could help them provide better care.

Policymakers and community organisations must recognise and formalise the contributions of social fathers to ensure children receive consistent and supportive care.

What happens now?
Many men struggle to find their place in a rapidly evolving society where gender expectations are no longer fixed.

The rise of feminism and women’s empowerment has rightly expanded opportunities for women, but has left a gap in guiding men towards constructive ways of engaging with these changes.

Additionally, it remains true that more women than men are unemployed. This is primarily due to societal expectations that women should be homemakers or primary caregivers.

Policies that recognise diverse forms of fatherhood will be essential in fostering positive father-child relationships for future generations.

Authors
Wessel Van Den Berg
Research fellow, Stellenbosch University

Kopano Ratele
Professor of Psychology, Stellenbosch University

Mandisa Malinga
Senior Lecturer in Psychology, University of Cape Town

Tawanda Makusha
Senior Research Associate, Africa Health Research Institute (AHRI)

Disclosure statement
Wessel Van Den Berg works for Equimundo: Center for Masculinities and Social Justice.

Kopano Ratele is a member of the Psychological Society of South Africa.

Mandisa Malinga has previously received research funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa.

Tawanda Makusha is affiliated with the University of KwaZulu-Natal

.store

24/12/2025

🎅✨ Happy Holidays from Mewtee! ✨🎄

The year is ending, and we couldn’t be more grateful for our amazing clients, partners, and followers. Thank you for being part of our journey!

May your holiday season be full of joy, laughter, and a touch of tech magic. Here’s to a new year of innovation, growth, and endless possibilities!

Merry Christmas & Happy New Year!
- The Mewtee Team

23/12/2025

Benin’s failed coup: three factors behind the takeover attempt

Military elements attempted to topple Benin’s government in early December 2025. However, unlike other coups across the Sahel and west Africa since 2020, this bid triggered a military response from Benin’s neighbours.

Benin is a west African state of 14.8 million people bordered by Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.

Responding to two requests for assistance from the government of President Patrice Talon, Nigeria deployed fighter jets and the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) deployed elements of its standby force to target and dislodge the pro-coup forces.

Ecowas intervention likely played an important role in undermining the coup’s momentum and restoring order. The dozen or so putschists scored early tactical successes. They captured and broadcast from the national television station, occupied a military camp, and even took the two senior-most army officers hostage. But once Ecowas intervened militarily, any fence-sitters concluded that loyalists would prevail. Rather than a broad-based uprising, only 14 were arrested with a few plotters still at large.

I’m a scholar who maintains the Colpus dataset of coups and I have documented the history of post-second world war coups. As part of this work, I have sought to document the complex causes and effects of Africa’s post-2020 “epidemic of coups”, now entering its fifth year.

Though details remain scant on the motives of the coup plotters led by Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri, three structural factors likely contributed to the latest coup attempt:

growing autocracy under Talon since 2016

rising jihadist violence in Benin’s north that is spilling over from Sahel neighbours

deepening coup contagion as Africa’s coup belt now threatens the west African region.

From democratic backsliding to democratic u-turn?
Benin does not have a history of recent coups. It had not suffered a bona fide coup attempt since January 1975.

In the first 15 years after independence from France in 1960, Dahomey (as the country was then called) experienced nine coup attempts, making it one of the most coup-prone countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the early Cold War period.

However, political instability through the early 1970s gave way to the stable and durable personalist regime of Mathieu Kérékou (1972-1990). This was followed by electoral democracy after the Cold War.

Until recently, Benin had been heralded as one of Africa’s “democratic outliers” and success cases of democratic survival despite challenging conditions. Though poor, Benin has seen decades of improving average living standards. Economic growth in 2025 was 7.5%; the latest unrest cannot be blamed on poverty or an economic crisis.

However, data on three key dimensions of democracy shows that although electoral contestation and participation have endured, constraints on the executive (and thus liberal democracy overall) have declined in Benin since Talon’s election as president in 2016.

According to autocratic regime data from US political scientists Barbara Geddes, Joe Wright and Erica Frantz as well as the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (which surveys experts about democracy worldwide), Benin slipped back into an electoral autocracy in 2019. That is when opposition candidates were prevented from competing in parliamentary elections. The polls were marred by repression of mass protests and an internet shutdown.

In 2021, an electoral boycott led to Talon’s easy re-election.

V-Dem data show a very partial and incomplete democratic rebound since 2022. The opposition was allowed to compete in the January 2023 parliamentary elections. And earlier this year Talon confirmed that he would not seek an unconstitutional third term.

The potential for a coup, however, was foreshadowed last fall when the regime alleged that it had uncovered a coup plot involving a presidential hopeful in 2026. Last month, parliament’s vote to create a Senate was condemned by the opposition as allowing Talon a means to influence affairs after he steps down.

With the main opposition party barred from running in next year’s presidential election, Talon is expected to hand off power to his ally and finance minister, Romuald Wadagni.

Though the political leanings of Tigri and coup plotters remain unclear, Tigri claimed to seek to “free the people from dictatorship”.

The coupmakers also presumably sought to block the upcoming 2026 parliamentary and presidential elections.

A growing jihadist threat
Among the coup leaders’ key complaints was Talon’s mismanagement of the country. In particular, they cited “continuing deterioration of the security situation in northern Benin and "the ignorance and neglect of the situation of our brothers in arms who have fallen at the front” due to worsening jihadist violence.

A number of coups in nearby countries since 2020 have been preceded by rising levels of political violence and deepening insecurity born of jihadist insurgencies. That was certainly the case in Mali, Burkina Faso and to a lesser extent Niger.

Since last year, it has been clear that the jihadist violence was spilling over from Sahel neighbours such as Burkina Faso and Niger into the borderlands of west Africa. This included Benin’s north. ACLED data show a major increase in political violence events since 2022. And a spike in political fatalities in 2024:

Much of this increased violence is attributable to the advance of operations by the al-Qaida affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The group also managed to launch its first fatal attack in Nigeria at the end of October.

Russia has become the primary security partner for the Sahel Alliance. The defence pact was signed in 2023 by post-coup juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to defeat jihadists and maintain power.

Nevertheless, Benin has continued to rely on western security partners to aid its counter-insurgency efforts and bolster border security. Notably, Benin continues to welcome military cooperation with France. Since 2022 Paris has pledged greater military aid to combat terrorism.

In September, US Africa Command commander General Dagvin Anderson visited Benin to underscore cooperation to oppose terrorism.

During the coup attempt, Tigri reportedly warned against French intervention and railed against “imperialism”. The speech reportedly ended with the phrase “The Republic or Death”, which echoes the new motto of Burkina Faso’s junta.

This suggests that the coup makers may have been inspired by others in the Sahel.

Risk of the coup belt expanding

The Benin events mark the third coup attempt and first failed coup this year in the Sahel region. There have been 17 coup attempts in Africa since 2020, including 11 successful coups. This makes the African coup belt stretching across the Sahel and west Africa the global epicentre of coups.

West Africa’s latest “copycat” coup attempt was condemned by the African Union, European Union and Ecowas. Yet it was praised by pro-Russian social media accounts, reflecting a growing cleavage between the Russia-aligned juntas of the Sahel Alliance and the remaining Ecowas-aligned civilian regimes of west Africa.

Although Nigeria-led Ecowas threatened military intervention after the coup in Niger in July 2023, the regional body only actually militarily intervened to defeat the coup attempt in Benin. Nigeria, it appears, has drawn a line in the sand to retain a buffer from further instability – including JNIM operations. On the same day of the coup attempt in Benin, it was reported that Nigeria was seeking greater aid from France to combat insecurity.

Author
John Joseph Chin
Assistant Teaching Professor of Strategy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon University

Disclosure statement
John Joseph Chin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Mewtee

26/12/2025

25/12/2025

24/12/2025

24/12/2025

23/12/2025

Address

Telephone

Website

Alerts

Shortcuts

Share