The Voiceless

22/11/2024

Introducing The Voiceless — The Mouthpiece of the Marginalised Voices!

Overview

The Voiceless is a transformative online media platform dedicated to amplifying the voices of the marginalized, overlooked, and underrepresented in society. Our mission is to reshape the narrative landscape by providing a space where every individual, regardless of their background or status, can share their perspective and contribute to meaningful public discourse.

Our Vision

We aim to create a world where:

1. Public conversations are inclusive, not dominated by a privileged few.
2. Diverse viewpoints are embraced, debated, and celebrated as essential to a healthy democracy.
3. Freedom of expression is upheld for all, empowering every citizen with an informed opinion to participate in shaping societal narratives.

What We Offer

The Voiceless is not just a platform but a movement. Here’s what sets us apart:

Core Features

• User-Generated Content Submission
Contributors can easily submit articles, opinion pieces, and creative works via our platform. Our editorial team ensures that submissions meet our quality standards while maintaining the authenticity of each voice.

• Community-Centered Content
Content is curated to highlight stories, challenges, and perspectives from marginalized communities, ensuring inclusivity and representation.

• Interactive Debate Forums
Users can engage in meaningful conversations, share ideas, and debate pressing issues in moderated forums that prioritize respect and constructive dialogue.

• Educational Resources
Tools, guides, and workshops are available to empower users to articulate their ideas effectively and engage in civil discourse.

• Multimedia Integration
We leverage blogs, podcasts, and video content to provide dynamic and accessible storytelling formats that cater to diverse audiences.

Why Choose The Voiceless?

1. Inclusivity First: We prioritize voices that mainstream media often overlooks.
2. Empowering the Youth: We give young people a platform to share their thoughts and contribute to societal change.
3. Democratizing Discourse: Our platform is free from elitism and gatekeeping, making it accessible to all.

How to Get Involved

• Follow Us: Stay updated on Facebook: Voiceless.

• Submit Your Work: Send your articles to [email protected].

• Support Us: Partner with us to sponsor content, host events, or share your expertise.

Let The Voiceless be the platform where untold stories are heard, and diverse perspectives shape the future. Together, let’s unbreak the news and redefine the narrative.

22/11/2024

Centre for Emerging Writers (C4EW)

— Empowering Emerging Writers, Transforming Futures

The Centre for Emerging Writers (C4EW) is an innovative initiative dedicated to nurturing the next generation of writers and researchers. By fostering a culture of reading, writing, and critical thinking, C4EW aims to empower high school learners and undergraduate students across South Africa, preparing them to contribute meaningfully to society.

Vision and Mission

Vision: To create a South Africa where literacy, critical thinking, and research are accessible to all, fostering a nation of empowered and informed individuals.

Mission: To nurture and mentor emerging writers and researchers, building their confidence, skills, and opportunities to contribute meaningfully to their communities and society at large.

Why C4EW Matters

South Africa faces a literacy crisis:
• 82% of Grade 4 learners cannot read for meaning (2030 Reading Panel).
• 51% of households lack a single book (PwC report).
• Only 14% of the population actively reads books.

With 3.7 million adults still illiterate, addressing this challenge demands deliberate, collective action. C4EW is committed to bridging this gap by equipping young minds with the skills and mentorship needed to succeed in academia and beyond.

Value Proposition

C4EW provides life-changing opportunities for both Candidates and Fellows:
• For Candidates: Access to expert mentorship, detailed feedback, and skill-building opportunities in research and writing, fostering academic and personal growth.
• For Fellows: A platform to share expertise, mentor the next generation, and contribute to South Africa’s literacy and research development.

What We Offer

1. Research & Writing Mentorship

Our mentorship program connects aspiring writers (Candidates) with skilled postgraduate professionals (Fellows) who offer personalized guidance. Key skills include:

• Effective use of research databases
• Citations & referencing
• Basic, intermediate, and advanced research & writing techniques

2. Undergraduate Paper Reviews & Editing

Students can submit their research papers, essays, or assignments for expert feedback, editing, and substantive comments from qualified Fellows in their field of study.

Service Fee:

• R200 for papers up to 1,500 words
• R300 for papers up to 2,000 words

Submissions must be made at least 7 days before the due date to ensure high-quality feedback and promote early planning.

Note: Fellows are strictly prohibited from writing papers on behalf of Candidates. Violations will lead to disciplinary action.

Who Can Join?

• Candidates: Aspiring writers and researchers in high school or undergraduate studies who seek mentorship and support.
• Fellows: Experienced professionals with postgraduate qualifications, passionate about mentoring the next generation.

How to Join

Step 1: Complete the online questionnaire.
Step 2: Alternatively, send an email to [email protected] with:

• Your name and surname
• Your school/institution (for Candidates)
• Your postgraduate qualifications (for Fellows)

Measurement of Impact

C4EW is committed to tracking its impact through:
• Number of Candidates and Fellows enrolled.
• Improvement in academic performance of Candidates (pre- and post-program evaluations).
• Mentorship hours completed and research papers improved.
• Testimonials and feedback from participants.

Testimonials and Success Stories

“Through C4EW, I gained confidence in my academic writing, which helped me secure a scholarship for postgraduate studies.” – Thapelo

“Being a Fellow at C4EW allowed me to mentor a young writer who went on to publish their first article. It’s been an incredibly rewarding experience.” – Lehumo

Sustainable Funding Model

To ensure long-term sustainability, C4EW will adopt a hybrid funding model:
• Affordable Fees: A nominal charge for paper reviews and editing services.
• Corporate Sponsorships: Partnering with companies to fund the initiative in exchange for recognition or co-branding opportunities.
• Grants: Seeking government and non-profit grants focused on literacy development.

Partnerships and Collaborations

C4EW will collaborate with:
• Schools and universities to identify talented students.
• NGOs and literacy organizations to enhance outreach efforts.
• Corporates and donors for financial support and scholarships.

Expansion Plans

• Short-Term Goals: Establish a solid foundation of Candidates and Fellows.
• Mid-Term Goals: Expand to underserved rural areas, ensuring inclusivity.
• Long-Term Goals: Build a nationwide network of skilled writers and researchers contributing to academia and industry.

Community Engagement

To foster a sense of community and motivation, C4EW will:
• Host writing competitions with prizes or scholarships.
• Organize webinars with successful South African writers and researchers.
• Recognize outstanding Candidates and Fellows through annual awards.

Diversity and Inclusivity

C4EW is committed to ensuring representation from all demographics, with a particular focus on:
• Rural learners with limited access to resources.
• Differently-abled individuals requiring customized support.
• Marginalized groups, empowering voices that often go unheard.

Building a Better South Africa Through Literacy

At C4EW, we believe that every young writer has the potential to shape the future. Join us in cultivating a culture of excellence in reading, writing, and research—together, we can write a brighter tomorrow.

Contact Us:
📧 Email: [email protected]
✍️ Apply Today: C4EW Registration Form (https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfY7crz9KlSxX_CCsvQxI9O6G507r5nLGvNUDa-KXMHGYr0sQ/viewform?vc=0&c=0&w=1&flr=0)

19/11/2024

OPINION: The DA, like the ANC, has a legitimate mandate to implement its policies within the GNU

Contrary to conventional wisdom and popular belief, the Democratic Alliance (DA) stands not as a subordinate to the African National Congress (ANC) but as an equal “coalition” partner in South Africa’s current Government of National Unity (GNU). All things considered, the GNU represents a practical co-governance arrangement, not a surrender of one party’s principles to the other.

The DA has a legitimate mandate to pursue and implement its policies within the GNU, just as the ANC does. However, this partnership seems increasingly fraught, especially in the wake of accusations of “white supremacy” and racial bias levelled against DA cabinet ministers. This rhetoric only exacerbates divisions and distracts from the real issues facing South Africans.

Labelling DA cabinet ministers as “white supremacists” because they challenge the ANC’s policy direction in the GNU does nothing to advance constructive dialogue. Instead, it fuels the narrative of division, fostering an outdated inferiority complex that holds black South Africans back from claiming their rightful place on the social and economic hierarchy.

Resorting to racial accusations whenever there is a disagreement between GNU partners is counterproductive. It reinforces stereotypes and hallows the legitimate and genuine cries of the true victims of racism. It also makes it harder to address genuine concerns about racial equity and social progress.

As I have previously argued, the GNU was not born out of a convergence of ideals. Rather, it was a byproduct of political expediency — formed after every political party to the arrangement abruptly abandoned its principles to secure a seat at the dinner table. Or to put rather charitably, the GNU was a necessary compromise in a fragmented political landscape.

The ANC and the DA each made concessions, setting aside some of their guiding principles in order to collaborate. Yet, these concessions should not be mistaken for ideological capitulation. Helen Zille, the DA’s veteran leader and Federal Chairperson, has made it clear that the DA did not enter this partnership to be marginalized or controlled by the ANC.

The DA, according to her, joined the GNU as an equal player, with the intent of actively shaping the direction of the GNU Criticism aimed at the DA’s participation in the GNU, often couched in accusations of racial insensitivity or superiority, overlooks a fundamental reality: it was the ANC that chose to go into government with the DA, not the other around. By inviting the DA into the GNU, the ANC accepted the responsibilities and consequences of sharing power with a party whose values and vision for South Africa differ markedly from its own.

If ANC supporters are dismayed by the DA’s influence, they must confront the fact that this partnership was borne out of the ANC’s strategic decisions or blunders. Instead of dismissing DA cabinet ministers as interlopers, it is time for the ANC to adjust to a co-governance model that includes ideological diversity.

This political marriage of convenience challenges both the ANC and the DA to mature in their approach to governance. Each must resist the temptation to resort to race-based arguments or accusations to deflect from policy discussions. Doing so only impedes the constructive dialogue needed to tackle the socio-economic challenges facing the nation. The GNU should serve as an opportunity for both parties to bridge divides and demonstrate that South Africa’s democracy is resilient and adaptable.

Ordinary South Africans are well within their right to expect their leaders to rise above factionalism and work together to achieve tangible improvements for the people. The GNU could mark a new chapter in South African governance—one in which ideological differences coexist within a framework of shared responsibility. However, to realize this potential, both the ANC and the DA must commit to a relationship grounded in mutual respect, even amidst their contrasting political ideologies.

Ultimately, this partnership is a test of South Africa’s political maturity. If the ANC and DA can move beyond racialized conflict and collaborate in the service of all citizens, they will provide a powerful example of democratic resilience. This experiment in co-governance, difficult though it may be, has the potential to strengthen the country’s democratic foundation—if only both sides will approach it with the vision and discipline it demands.

18/11/2024

OPINION: It Beggars Belief That Floyd Shivambu Exited the EFF on His Own Volition

Politics, unlike religion, is inherently dynamic. Loyalties shift, and strategies evolve, often within remarkably short periods. Floyd Shivambu’s sudden departure—or non-renewal of membership—from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) exemplifies this fluidity. His exit has sent ripples across South Africa’s political landscape, sparking widespread debate about its cause and implications.

While mainstream political analysts have speculated extensively about Floyd’s reasons for leaving the EFF, their conclusions vary. One prevalent theory suggests that Floyd’s move to the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party was strategic, aimed at helping the party prepare for an elective conference reportedly called for by its members. This theory aligns with Floyd’s reputation as one of the EFF’s intellectual architects. He played a critical role in drafting the party’s founding document, manifesto, and constitution and is credited with shaping many of its policies and ideas.

Another line of thought posits that Floyd’s departure was not voluntary but rather the result of internal pressures within the EFF. Reports from City Press claim that wealthy businesspeople approached Floyd, allegedly offering financial support for a leadership challenge against Julius Malema at the party’s December elective congress. Similarly, the Sunday Times reported that Floyd felt undermined by Malema, who allegedly sought a deputy presidency in a Government of National Unity while Floyd was negotiating the EFF’s role in such an arrangement.

Whether these claims are true or speculative, Floyd’s departure seems to have been influenced by Malema himself. Julius may have calculated that Floyd posed a credible threat to his leadership, particularly given growing discontent among party members about his authoritarian leadership style. Malema likely sought to neutralize this potential challenge before the elective congress.

Ultimately, only time will reveal the true reasons behind Floyd’s exit. However, the notion that he left the EFF of his own volition is difficult to accept. What happened to Floyd mirrors the concept of “constructive dismissal” in employment relations—a situation in which an employee resigns because their working conditions are made intolerable. It is plausible that Julius deliberately made Floyd’s position within the party untenable, particularly after the EFF’s poor performance in KwaZulu-Natal, where Floyd had been deployed to consolidate support. This, coupled with the party’s harsh treatment of other leaders for perceived failures, strengthens the argument that Floyd was pushed out rather than leaving voluntarily.

Still, Floyd’s political capital should not be overstated. While he is undoubtedly a thinker, his lack of charisma, charm, and mass appeal limits his potential for political success. Unlike figures like Malema or Jacob Zuma, who captivate audiences with performative politics, Floyd’s rhetoric is too intellectual and policy-driven for the average voter. Julius and Zuma excel at employing what sociologist Julia Sonnevend describes as the “techniques of charm,” which include performing authenticity, breaking from routine, and equalizing diverse audiences into a coherent community. These tactics resonate with the public far more than ideas alone.

History has shown that politicians who rely solely on intellectualism struggle to gain traction. The fates of figures like Andile Mngxitama and Ace Magashule are testament to this reality. They, too, believed that ideas could carry them to political power, only to be proven wrong. Floyd, despite his intellectual contributions, may face a similar trajectory if he cannot adapt to the performative demands of modern politics.

Speculation around Floyd’s exit will undoubtedly continue, but one thing is clear: politicians, regardless of ideology, will do whatever it takes to secure their place at the proverbial table. Floyd Shivambu’s departure from the EFF is no exception to this rule.

31/10/2024

OPINION: The DA, like the ANC, has a legitimate mandate to implement its policies within the GNU

Contrary to conventional wisdom and popular belief, the Democratic Alliance (DA) stands not as a subordinate to the African National Congress (ANC) but as an equal “coalition” partner in South Africa’s current Government of National Unity (GNU). All things considered, the GNU represents a practical co-governance arrangement, not a surrender of one party’s principles to the other.

The DA has a legitimate mandate to pursue and implement its policies within the GNU, just as the ANC does. However, this partnership seems increasingly fraught, especially in the wake of accusations of “white supremacy” and racial bias levelled against DA cabinet ministers. This rhetoric only exacerbates divisions and distracts from the real issues facing South Africans.

Labelling DA cabinet ministers as “white supremacists” because they challenge the ANC’s policy direction in the GNU does nothing to advance constructive dialogue. Instead, it fuels the narrative of division, fostering an outdated inferiority complex that holds black South Africans back from claiming their rightful place on the social and economic hierarchy.

Resorting to racial accusations whenever there is a disagreement between GNU partners is counterproductive. It reinforces stereotypes and hallows the legitimate and genuine cries of the true victims of racism. It also makes it harder to address genuine concerns about racial equity and social progress.

As I have previously argued, the GNU was not born out of a convergence of ideals. Rather, it was a byproduct of political expediency — formed after every political party to the arrangement abruptly abandoned its principles to secure a seat at the dinner table. Or to put rather charitably, the GNU was a necessary compromise in a fragmented political landscape.

The ANC and the DA each made concessions, setting aside some of their guiding principles in order to collaborate. Yet, these concessions should not be mistaken for ideological capitulation. Helen Zille, the DA’s veteran leader and Federal Chairperson, has made it clear that the DA did not enter this partnership to be marginalized or controlled by the ANC.

The DA, according to her, joined the GNU as an equal player, with the intent of actively shaping the direction of the GNU Criticism aimed at the DA’s participation in the GNU, often couched in accusations of racial insensitivity or superiority, overlooks a fundamental reality: it was the ANC that chose to go into government with the DA, not the other around.

By inviting the DA into the GNU, the ANC accepted the responsibilities and consequences of sharing power with a party whose values and vision for South Africa differ markedly from its own.

If ANC supporters are dismayed by the DA’s influence, they must confront the fact that this partnership was borne out of the ANC’s strategic decisions or blunders. Instead of dismissing DA cabinet ministers as interlopers, it is time for the ANC to adjust to a co-governance model that includes ideological diversity.

This political marriage of convenience challenges both the ANC and the DA to mature in their approach to governance. Each must resist the temptation to resort to race-based arguments or accusations to deflect from policy discussions. Doing so only impedes the constructive dialogue needed to tackle the socio-economic challenges facing the nation.

The GNU should serve as an opportunity for both parties to bridge divides and demonstrate that South Africa’s democracy is resilient and adaptable.

Ordinary South Africans are well within their right to expect their leaders to rise above factionalism and work together to achieve tangible improvements for the people. The GNU could mark a new chapter in South African governance—one in which ideological differences coexist within a framework of shared responsibility.

However, to realize this potential, both the ANC and the DA must commit to a relationship grounded in mutual respect, even amidst their contrasting political ideologies. Ultimately, this partnership is a test of South Africa’s political maturity. If the ANC and DA can move beyond racialized conflict and collaborate in the service of all citizens, they will provide a powerful example of democratic resilience.

This experiment in co-governance, difficult though it may be, has the potential to strengthen the country’s democratic foundation—if only both sides will approach it with the vision and discipline it demands.

Critic of the Critical Critics — Cornerstone!

29/09/2024

OPINION: The Paradox of Attracting Foreign Investment into South Africa

Editor’s Note: This is an expanded version of the article that was published on the 24th of September.

In a nutshell:

• While foreign investment boosts South Africa’s economy, capital outflows from foreign-owned firms limit its overall impact. Sustainable growth requires not just more investment, but deeper reforms that benefit the local population and shift ownership patterns.

The economic success or struggles of nations around the globe are frequently linked to the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), or the lack thereof, often caused by regulatory hurdles. While the critical role that both FDI and FPI play in driving economic growth is well-established, South Africa’s trade data suggests that these forms of investment alone are insufficient to solve the country’s sluggish economic growth.

For example, South Africa has consistently maintained a positive trade balance, with exports exceeding imports in recent years. In 2021, the country recorded a trade surplus for the fifth consecutive year. In June 2024, South Africa posted its largest trade surplus since May 2022, reaching ZAR 24.2 billion.

However, while this trade surplus could be expected to boost the value of the rand and promote economic growth, the effects have been undermined by a primary income deficit. Many of the firms driving South Africa’s export success are foreign-owned, meaning that much of the surplus is negated by the outflow of dividends and interest payments to foreign investors. Thus, the positive trade balance has not translated into broader economic benefits for the country.

Complicating this situation further is the fact that South Africa has also consistently held a positive Net International Investment Position (NIIP)—the difference between the country's foreign assets and liabilities. This suggests that the value of what South Africa owns abroad exceeds what it owes to foreign entities. Despite this, foreign-owned assets in South Africa generate substantial returns for their owners, resulting in capital outflows that exacerbate the primary income deficit, limiting the broader economic impact.

Recent news reports have suggested that the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) has sparked a surge in investment due to improved investor confidence. However, attributing South Africa’s economic challenges solely to poor investor confidence oversimplifies the issue. Foreign investors have long been active in South Africa, as evidenced by the presence of numerous multinational corporations listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

The paradox lies in the nature of their involvement: while foreign investors bring capital into the country, they also extract significant value in the form of dividends and profits. This is akin to a situation where one hand gives, and the other takes away. As highlighted earlier, this dynamic is reflected in South Africa’s ongoing primary income deficit.

To address these challenges, South Africa must go beyond simply attracting more foreign investment. Meaningful economic reform must focus on improving the livelihoods of the poor and middle class. Changing the ownership patterns within the economy is a necessary step, but such changes cannot be achieved through legislation alone. Legislative efforts often create unintended consequences, potentially exacerbating existing problems.

The first step towards sustainable economic reform is reducing the country’s reliance on debt-financed consumption, a practice often facilitated by banks in collaboration with the Reserve Bank. Additionally, fostering a culture of savings and local investment is crucial. This would ensure that the gains from South Africa’s trade surpluses remain within the country, benefiting its citizens through the interest and dividends they would earn.

While it is true that South Africa needs foreign investment, it is equally, if not more important, to address the ownership patterns within the economy to ensure that the benefits of growth and investment reach the country's poorer and middle-income groups.

Critic of the Critical Critics — Cornerstone!

24/09/2024

OPINION: Why foreign investment (FDI or FPI) is not a panacea for SA’s economic woes

The economic successes or challenges faced by many countries globally are often attributed to either foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign portfolio investment or the throttling of the two through a cumbersome regulatory environment. While FDI and FPI's significant role in fostering economic growth is widely acknowledged, South Africa’s trade statistics suggest that FDI and FPI alone are not solutions to the country's economic difficulties.

For instance, South Africa has maintained a consistent positive trade balance in recent years, exporting more than it imports. In 2021, the country recorded a trade surplus for the fifth consecutive year—well before the formation of the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU), which is said been credited as an “investor confidence trigger” . In June 2024, South Africa achieved its highest trade surplus, amounting to ZAR 24.2 billion since May 2022.

Ordinarily, such a trade surplus would strengthen the currency and spur economic growth. However, this was offset by a primary income deficit. Many of the companies driving South Africa’s export growth are foreign-owned, meaning they remit dividends and pay interest on loans used for expansion, negating the benefits of the trade surplus.

It has been recently reported that the formation of the GNU has led to a surge in investment, thanks to improved investor confidence. However, the narrative around poor investor confidence does not fully capture the complexity of South Africa’s economic challenges. Foreign-investors are already heavily involved in the country, but the issue is that while they invest on one hand, they extract value on the other. This dynamic is exemplified by South Africa’s persistent primary income deficit.

Thus, additional measures are needed to improve the livelihoods of the country's poor and middle class. A conscious and deliberate effort must be made to change ownership patterns within the economy. However, such changes cannot simply be legislated into existence; legislative and executive decrees often create more problems than they solve.

The first step toward meaningful economic reform is to curb the country’s reliance on debt-financed consumption, which is often facilitated by banks in collaboration with the Reserve Bank. South Africa must cultivate a culture of savings and local investment to ensure that the benefits of the country’s trade surplus remain within the country, accruing to its people through interest and dividends from major exporters.

South Africa needs foreign investment, but no more than it needs to change the ownership patterns in its economy.

14/09/2024

“It should be clear by now that banks are the only businesses in the whole global economy which operate on liabilities from which they also make their income.

“This business model explains why there are many entry barriers to the business of opening a bank.

“Even if one eventually manages to satisfy all entry barriers and get the license to open and operate a bank, they will still be met with a myriad of expensive regulations which a new bank will find almost impossible to comply with.

“The ultimately goal of these regulations seems to be keeping the average person out of this lucrative business of generating money from thin air.”

Sometimes the failure of banks also results in the loss of customers lifetime savings

06/07/2024

OPINION: Protectionism hits the legal profession

03/07/2024

OPINION | It Ought To Be Unlawful For Employers To Retrench Employees for Technological Reasons

03/07/2024

OPINION: Currency fluctuations: How “political” is the South African rand?

24/06/2024

OPINION | A GNU or the DA, IFP et al’s backdoor entrance to the Union Buildings ?

I recently wrote and expressed my confidence and hope in the success of the so called Government of National Unity (GNU) or what some detractors have characterised as a “Grand Coalition” between the ANC and DA. My hope in the success of this political arrangement is premised on a number of factors:

1. A GNU can enhance democratic governance as decisions in a GNU are almost always taken after thorough consultation with all partners to arrangement. This also serves to enrich the quality of the final decision to be implemented as inputs are generated from different minds.

2. A GNU has the potential to improve transparency, accountability and openness in the administration of public affairs.

3. A GNU can further ensure that there’s an effective system of checks and balances — those running public offices through a GNU/coalition government always have an accountability bullet hanging over their heads.

4. No single political party in a GNU will wield enough power to steamroll democratic institutions like Parliament and subject it to its whims.

5. A GNU can ensure that the ANC no longer steals from the national coffers as much as it used to when it had the outright majority to form a government alone.

6. The realities of governing at national level will sensitise the DA about the bread and butter issues of the vast majority of black people in South Africa which it had overlooked for years.

7. The system of checks and balances inherent in a political arrangement of this nature has the potential to ensure efficient and effective public administration.

On the flip side, however, any political arrangement that begins with a promise to put political and ideological differences aside ultimately becomes a facade. The DA for example, has for many years stood opposed to the so called pro-black policies of the ANC like the BBBEE, the NHI, the National Minimum Wage Act, state ownership of enterprises in favour privatisation etc. The DA will be very hard-pressed to convince any reasonable person that it has suddenly abandoned its stance on these policies or “put its ideological and political differences” with the ANC aside.

It would seem that the DA has in fact abandoned principles for positions at the dinner table. This is nevertheless understandable. It might have suddenly dawned upon those at the upper echelons of the party’s leadership structures that the only way to the Union Buildings is through the backdoor. After all, it does seem like the DA will ever amass enough electoral votes to form a national government alone. Or perhaps the conspiracy that the DA and the ANC (under Ramaphosa) are controlled somewhere in Stellenbosch also has some semblance of truth. Otherwise, what else can explain this arrangement?

It surely cannot be the need to create stability in the country, let alone clean governance as some would make us believe because if that were true, the DA would have been happy to remain in the opposition benches and continued to make every effort to present itself as a viable alternative to the ANC — a job it has done well until recently. But actions have consequences, a rational DA voter is likely to see this arrangement for what it truly is — an office-seeking arrangement negotiated under the pretext of good governance. A vote for the DA is now seemingly a vote for the ANC and vice versa.

Nothing much needs to be said about the fate that lies ahead for the ANC. The cracks are starting to show internally with some tendering their resignation while others have started issuing public statements in opposition to the arrangement. The markets may be happy with the arrangement, the rent might be strengthening, Stellenbosch might be dancing, but not everyone within the ANC is smiling.

The Voiceless is the Mouthpiece of the Marginalised Voices.