27/06/2022
Collective Security, not Self Defence
~*Hussaini Abdu, PhD*
Banditry has become the single most important threat to lives and livelihood in Nigeria. I feel for the bandit occupied communities of the northwest and north central parts of Nigeria. Particularly those in Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Niger and Kwara. These communities are virtually under siege. It is the start of a new planting season; farmers cannot access their farms; they couldn’t harvest last year and the year before; those that managed to harvest couldn’t access their regular markets, if they did, they never returned home safely. They can’t attend wedding ceremonies of their loved ones; they can’t perform their religious obligations in congregation and their children have been long out of school. They cannot visit their sick neighbour or attend the funeral of their deceased relatives. Thousands have been displaced and rendered destitute. The bandit and armed robbers/kidnappers have taken total control of these communities, kidnapping for incredible ransom, imposing levies on poor communities, killing indiscriminately, and perpetrating gruesome gender-based violence. In this situation, the security agencies and civil authorities appear as helpless as the hapless communities.
While the real/perceived inaction of the government is very frustrating, as the daily statistics of violent crimes continue to mount, it is important to caution that we don’t allow our individual and collective exasperation to compound our misery. Governor Bello Matawalle’s recent proclamation that citizens in Zamfara state will be allowed to bear arms in self-defence appears not only impetuous, but also a huge risk to the collective security of the people as it stands to compound the already bad situation. While I appreciate his frustration, considering what people are going through in Zamfara state and the apparent failure to contain the over a decade long crisis, self-defence in face of mass violence is simply a recipe for anarchy. Such an indiscriminate arming of communities is the easiest path to anomie. Fi****ms, especially in the hands of the untrained can be addictive. It proffers unusual power, that is often difficult to let go. It is partly for this reason that banditry and related crimes have become intractable. Their access to fi****ms has given them unfettered power and resources, which they may never relinquish unless they are compelled to do so.
State response to the situation should therefore be driven by principles of collective security, not self-defence. The starting point is to stop the incriminate killings. I am not interested in the polemics of whether it should be through military action or negotiation. I don’t think the two are mutually exclusive. However, I am convinced that the subsisting security architecture is incapable of tackling the multi-layered security crisis in the country. Even if the armed groups are for any unlikely reason contained, the social, political, and economic structure of country will still produce more of their kind.
It is therefore my recommendation, that the governments of the effected states in collaboration with the Federal Government and possibly the support of multi-lateral and bilateral development institutions, establish a five year Clearing, Recovery and Peace Building programme to deal with the immediate and underlining causes of the crisis. The first two years should be committed to establishing the right atmosphere for any form of social development intervention. This will involve – taming the violence, containing arm trafficking, and mopping up the escalating small arms and light weapons in the region and providing support to victims and survivors. Doing this will involve setting up and recruiting a Special Community Defence Force in the affected states. Members of the special force should be offered a five-year contract, insured (health and group life insurance), trained, armed, and placed under the command and control of the Military and Police with clearly provided accountability mechanism. Depending on the depth of the crisis, each state should be required to recruit at least 10,000 men and women, clustered in two groups: While a set joins the military action against the armed groups in their respective hideouts, the other cluster will support the police in civil policing activities in the affected villages. The essence is primarily to stop the violence and reestablish civil authority in the affected communities. Both military and police action should be supported by technology. Including area surveillance satellites and secured communication system.
The programme should be designed with an exist plan. Such plan should include mechanism for demobilizing the Community Special Force – prepare them for new jobs and vocations, retaining some in the military and police, and pay attractive severance package at the end of the programme.
Containing the ravaging violence is as important as addressing the underlining causes. The military and policing component should be complimented with clear and accountable government-led social development and cohesion programme. Including better climate change adaptation and mitigation programme, investing in social development to reduce the level of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and ensure better health service for the people; invest in rebuilding sense of community, social cohesion and ensure social justice for all. Institute a transitional justice programme, to enable a better understanding of the dynamics of the crisis, identify roles played by different actors and deploy locally acceptable means of ensuring accountability and justice.
To fund the five-year programme, each participating state should invest at least 15% of its annual budget in the intervention, while the federal government invests a minimum of 7%. The programme should be supported by a small office and governed by representatives of government (Federal, state and LGA), private sector, civil society, affected communities and interested development partners. The funds should be audited annually, and the programme evaluated. This should not be another government instituted regional intervention or commission, but a rapid intervention programme, with a clear objective and lifespan. We’ve seen how special regional intervention programme have been hijacked and turned into cash cows for vested interests.
I recognize that this crisis has also been an opportunity for blatant theft of public funds and rapacious accumulation, not just by politicians, but other self-serving interest groups involved in the bandit economy and supply chain: From bandit informants to drug and arms dealers, village health officials, some compromised security agents, traditional rulers, food vendors and government officials who are pilfering public resources in the name of fighting banditry. In a context like this, no recommendation is foolproof. This is where leadership and our enlightened self-interest matters. We need leaders who can look beyond pecuniary gains and face this crisis frontally. It is important to appreciate that the crisis affects everyone. The feeling of insecurity that permeates the country is not good for our collective stability, productivity and development.
Hussaini Abdu, PhD
