16/07/2020
From Boko Haram in Nigeria: Historical and Political Economic Exploration (2015):
"The Recent History Boko Haram
The current trend of Boko Haram started in 2002, under the leadership of Muhammed Yussuf. The group is a right-wing Sunni/Salafi group that developed from existing Sunni group in the north. “Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, in the 1990s. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. His erstwhile mentor was Sheikh Jafaar Mahmud Adam, a prominent Islamic scholar and preacher at the mosque.” (ICG Report N°216, 2014)
The idea of Yussuf and the previous group he belonged to was to preach pure Islamic teachings and traditions, and ‘purify’ Islam practices from western ‘contaminations’. To this group, it is viewed that Islam, as is being practiced, has deviated from the original preaching. They backed up their views with the fact that society is now morally bankrupt, considering the liberal western culture of dressing, speaking, associating, etc., as signs of decadence in the society. More than this, they draw their best analysis from the inequality that has pervaded Nigerian society, coupled with high level of poverty in the society. Northern Nigeria has the highest rate of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy. (ICG Report N°216, 2014; Walker, A., 2012)
Drawing comparison between the rich and the poor, and making a conclusion that only religion, practised purely can resolve this contradiction, was enough to incite mass followership. The fact that the official Islamic authority in the northern Nigeria is also the traditional authority made this easier for the right-wing Sunni group. By linking the religious authority with the problem people are facing and showing that the religious authority has compromised religion for politics was a mobilizing factor for this group. This is not new. The history of northern Nigeria as earlier stated is linked with the use of religion for political and social ends. Added to this is the minimal social welfare scheme like providing food, clothing, Islamic education, shelter, etc., undertaken by Yussuf’s sect. This aside showing some ‘benevolent’ character of Boko Haram, also justified the sect’s doctrine and anti-state message, especially in view of the failure of the bourgeois political class in the north and nationally.
With the loss of moral authorities, northern political and traditional leaders, due to their involvement in rottenness that has defined politics, various reformist and later radical Islamic organizations – both rightwing – have arisen since the early 1980s, to put the north on the ‘right Islamic path’. The reformist groups include the Izala movement, the Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria and the Zakzaky movement; while the radical group includes the Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard) and Maitsesine group – the violent group for which Boko Haram shares some similar traits that existed from 1980 to 1984. (ICG Report N°216, 2014; Walker, A., 2012; Zenn, J., 2013; Falola, T., and Heaton, M. M., 2008; Falola, T., 1998)
From this looser Shababul group rose Muhammed Yussuf-led ultra-rightwing Boko Haram. Unlike the parent group, the Yussuf-led group went a step further to take a drastic way forward from the conclusion being drawn on implementation of ‘pure’ religious practices. For the Yussuf’s group, it is not enough to preach for moral rectification, it is important to take practical actions. This view was boosted by some factors. Firstly, Yussuf limited his campaign to the north, especially the core north, thus relying on uniformity and homogeneity of religion practice. While there are other religious groups, especially Roman Catholic and Pentecostal religious groups, in some part of the north, the core north (especially the upper part of the north) and north east (especially Borno and Yobe States) have strong Muslim base.
Furthermore, the belief that what Yussuf represent is another Islamic awareness similar to the Usman Dan Fodio movement was the current among his supporters and listeners (of his sermons). With campaign for religious purity, the Yussuf-led Boko Haram was trying to reenact the Dan Fodio movement that created a religious uniformity in the north. It is thus not accidental that Yussuf-led Boko haram moved away from mere preaching to political engagement and building religious communities. Of course, the parent group from which Yussuf split from flirted with politics and politicians; Yussuf’s group, on the basis of its radical idea of practical change, used all means including politics to advance its cause. According to ICG, Yussuf
“…was a member of the Borno State Sharia Implementation Committee under Governor Mallah Kachallah (1999-2003), and was active in debates on Islamic issues on local radio and television stations. A colleague recalled that even while on the committee, Yusuf was “against the system of government, and he used to regularly preach against it””
Added to this, as noted earlier, is the nature of religious authority in the north. The religious authority in the north is also the traditional authority, with the Sultan of Sokoto and Emir of Kano as highest religious authorities in the north. In other areas, it is the traditional authorities that also give religious directions, even when there are lots of Islamic scholars and authorities. Society is already streamlined along religious line, with the traditional authorities using not just the political power associated with traditional power, but also religion to assert authority. This means that opposition to the traditional and political authority will also take a religious dimension. This factor is linked with the degeneration of the state and politics in the country. The long years of military rule had strongly weakened the social fabric of not just the north but the whole country. While all this is happening, the rich and affluent in the society got better deals. Traditional authorities along with the rich few were beneficiaries of this rotten arrangement.
As noted earlier in the Introduction,
“Not to be left out is the fact that the period of the rise of this sect and its stronger hate doctrines coincided with the growing pauperization and suffering in the midst of unprecedented wealth. By 2009, Nigeria has earned nothing less than $300 billion from oil, yet joblessness, poverty and illiteracy were the order of the day, especially in the north. For instance, in 2012, about 80 percent of young people in Borno State, the cradle and base of Boko Haram, have no job, while poverty, put at over 80 percent in the same state, was the highest in the country. The sight of exotic mansion and cars of few rich, by young people, who come from poor families that live at the fringes, can only generate social crisis.”
Moreover, the easy link of northern Nigeria, both culturally and geographically, with North African countries, where radical rightwing Islamic sects have been able to build base is an added factor for the growth of Boko Haram. It is thus not accidental that Yussuf-led Boko haram was reported to have gained financial support, funding and tactical/organizational supports from some bigger and multinational rightwing religious sects in the North Africa and the Middle East.
Consequent upon rise in Yussuf’s membership strength, which ran to as much as over 180, 000, the organization tried to build a religious enclave, based on its ideology that western civilization and education is evil, and that relating and working in western establishment is sinful. The organization sought refuge in a community in Borno. This is strategic. While membership of Yussuf’s Boko Haram cut across many core northern states and even neighbouring countries like southern Niger, north eastern Cameroun and Chad, the base of the organization is in Borno. This has strategic, ideological and historical importance. Citing of the organization’s base in a border town in Borno state made trans-border crossing and operation, including access to resources and membership, easy; and this strengthened the organization.
The attempt of Boko Haram to implement the anti-west ideology by building a religious enclave met with friction with Nigerian state. Secondly, with several thousand members, it was difficult to implement a strictly anti-west ideology, as this would have created an operational problem for the group. Motorcycles, cars, electrical and electronic gadgets, etc., were needed by the sect to for its operation. Therefore, if not for strong indoctrination and stark ignorance, the inconsistency in ideology and implementation of ideology should have led to division within the organization. But like many ultra-rightwing religious groups and aspiring terrorist organizations, Boko Haram is premised on not just indoctrination, but also coercion, blackmail and threat. A father that subscribes to such an organization will bring along his children, wife (or wives) and other relation, under obligation to subscribe to the group. These kinds of groups also feed fat on the ignorance of the majority, disillusionment with the official authority and chronic poverty.
The friction between Yussuf’s Boko Haram and the Nigerian state generated violent clashes that led to killing of Boko Haram sect members in 2004. A graphic nature of Boko Haram in this period is provided by American Foreign Policy Council’s paper on Boko Haram in its “World Almanac of Islamism”:
“… For a short-lived period in 2003 several thousand members of the Nigerian Taliban “left the city, which is impure, and headed for the bush, believing that Muslims who do not share their ideology are infidels.” They called their encampment, which was located two miles from Nigeria’s border with Niger, “Afghanistan.” The local government ordered the Nigerian Taliban to leave “Afghanistan” when the community failed to respect local ordinances (since they considered the Nigerian government to be illegitimate). The friction between the Nigerian Taliban and the local government led to frequent clashes, including one battle in early 2004 in which several hundred members of the Nigerian Taliban attacked the residences of local government heads, regional officials, and the divisional police, killing several policemen and stealing police weapons and vehicles. The Nigerian security forces responded to the attacks by killing 18 Nigerian Taliban members, arresting a number of others, and destroying “Afghanistan.””
Flowing from this narration, it was glaring that peaceful nature of the Yussuf’s Boko Haram would have to give way to a more violent dimension as the implementation of the ideology in a secular Nigeria was bound to create crisis. The alternative to avoiding crisis is for Yussuf’s group and ideology to be assimilated into the more liberal Islamic leadership and authority in the north, and the political leadership. This was possible as the political leadership in the north, flowing from the bankrupt and neo-colonial nature of Nigerian politics and polity, was already using the card of religion through the enactment of Sharia law by northern local and regional governments since 2002, to hold on to stakes within the Nigerian corrupt political establishment. In reality, Yussuf explored this opportunity of integration into the mainstream political Islamic authority in the north.
For instance, aside avoiding direct confrontation with the official state, Yussuf leadership, established links with politicians and governments during this period. This involved using the Boko Haram members as campaign and support base for politicians and governments. In 2003, the group was reported to have worked for the emergence of Ali Modu Sherrif, as the governor of Borno State. In fact, there were reports that part of the conflict in 2004 and 2005 stemmed from the attempt of Sherrif administration to ditch agreement and terms of relationship with Boko Haram, which included not just financial support, presence in government and allocation of land, but also full implementation of Sharia law.
Clearly, there was a kind of resolution between Boko Haram and the government. For instance, one of the backers and financier of Yussuf’s Boko Haram, Buju Foi was a former Commissioner for Religious Affairs under Ali Modu Sherrif’s government, ostensibly as a concession to Boko Haram. Through him, funds were transferred to Boko Haram, which the group used to engage in arms trade. Foi reported resigned in 2007 as protest against Sherriff’s (Borno State governor) failure to fully implement Sharia, and was killed along with Yussuf in 2009 in the wake of mass purge of the group by the Nigerian state. (ICG Report N°216; Weekly Trust, 2010; Reuters, 2011)
In many other states, the implementation of Sharia by northern state governments saw the use of members of not just Boko Haram, which had spread across many northern (especially core north) states, but several other radical Islamic groups as implementers. Therefore, there was attempt to coopt the radical rightwing Islamic groups into the state/government.
Moreover, the attempt at implementation of Sharia, while it helped the state to not only use religion to seek for better deal from southerner-led Nigerian government, it also helped it to assimilate many of the radical groups and integrate them into the state. On the other hand, this policy helped the radical groups to infiltrate the state, and get needed resources, including human, material and strategic resources to spread not just among the poor people, but also among the elites and the powerful. Politicians also gained by using the groups to further their political interests. Therefore, there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between radical rightwing groups and the political structures in the north, even when the former rose on the basis of the failure of the latter."
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