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The Myth that White South Africans Are Discriminated Against by “Race Laws”Before engaging the claim that South Africa d...
09/01/2026

The Myth that White South Africans Are Discriminated Against by “Race Laws”

Before engaging the claim that South Africa discriminates against white South Africans through so-called “race laws,” it is necessary to establish the current distribution of power and representation in the country. Claims of discrimination cannot be evaluated in isolation from empirical realities. They must be tested against who holds land, capital, leadership, institutional authority, and political influence today.

White South Africans constitute approximately 7.3% of the national population, according to Statistics South Africa’s mid-year estimates. Despite this small demographic share, white South Africans remain significantly over-represented across several key sectors of power. These patterns are not speculative; they are documented across government audits, transformation reports, and sector-specific data.

In corporate governance, white South Africans continue to dominate boardrooms. Across Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies, multiple transformation reviews consistently show white individuals holding approximately 55% to 65% of board positions, including a disproportionate share of chairperson and executive director roles. While this represents a decline from the near-total control exercised during apartheid, it still constitutes a level of representation several times higher than population parity. Transformation at board level has proceeded markedly slower than in junior or middle management tiers, a pattern repeatedly noted in governance and equity assessments.

Land ownership remains even more skewed. Government land audits, reinforced by academic syntheses, indicate that white South Africans—despite comprising just over 7% of the population—continue to own between 50% and 70% of privately held commercial farmland. Although more than 8 million hectares have been transferred through land reform programmes since 1994, progress has been uneven. Structural challenges including land valuation disputes, inadequate post-transfer support, financing constraints, and land-use sustainability have limited redistribution outcomes. The persistence of white land dominance reflects institutional inertia, not racial persecution.

In the judiciary, transformation has been real but incomplete. As of the 2023/24 reporting period, white individuals accounted for approximately 31% of judges in South Africa’s superior courts. This is a substantial reduction from the pre-1994 judiciary, which was almost entirely white, yet it still represents more than four times white South Africans’ share of the national population. The judiciary therefore illustrates gradual correction, not reversal or exclusion.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has diversified significantly since the end of apartheid and is now predominantly Black. While comprehensive 2024 race-disaggregated data is limited, prior official reporting indicates that white individuals constituted around 10.9% of certain personnel samples. Importantly, whites—alongside Coloured and Indian South Africans—remain over-represented in skilled, professional, and specialist bands compared to entry-level and unskilled categories. This reflects historical education and recruitment pipelines rather than contemporary discrimination.

A similar pattern appears in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). As of the most recent consolidated data (2019), white individuals made up approximately 11.4% of the permanent force—again, well above population parity. Older rank-specific data illustrates the trajectory clearly: in 2009, white representation was roughly 32% at non-commissioned officer level and 41% among officers, while accounting for just 1.2% of new recruits at the lowest ranks. The trend is downward over time, indicating demographic correction through attrition and recruitment, not punitive exclusion.

In rugby, often cited emotively rather than empirically, the narrative of anti-white discrimination is particularly weak. Rugby’s historical association with the white Afrikaner community is undisputed. Transformation efforts have increased diversity, but not beyond stated targets. The 2019 Rugby World Cup-winning team, with six Black players in the starting fifteen, was widely recognised as a symbolic milestone. Yet as of May 2024, the Springboks had still failed to meet internal transformation targets of 54% “generic Black African” representation. Participation trends show that interest among Black South Africans has risen to approximately 61%, underscoring growth rather than exclusion.

In higher education, white student representation has declined substantially since apartheid. By 2021, white students comprised approximately 11.4% of total enrolments nationwide. At institutions such as the University of Johannesburg, white students accounted for around 4% of the 2024 student body. Academic staffing, however, remains an area of concern, with white academics still disproportionately represented in senior and professorial ranks—precisely the imbalance targeted by transformation policies.

In Parliament, representation is determined by electoral outcomes rather than racial quotas. Following the May 2024 general election, the Democratic Alliance secured 87 of 400 seats, drawing overwhelming support from white voters, whose turnout was estimated at 89.3%. There is no evidence of racial exclusion; white South Africans are represented through political participation in proportion to voting behaviour.

Against this empirical backdrop, the claim that South Africa enforces “anti-white race laws” becomes untenable.

Public discourse—amplified by figures such as Elon Musk—often references “149 laws” allegedly discriminating against white South Africans. This framing is fundamentally misleading. These are not race laws. They are equality and governance statutes designed to promote inclusive leadership and equitable participation across multiple dimensions, including gender, disability, youth access, and historical exclusion. Reducing them to “anti-white legislation” is a categorical misrepresentation.

South Africa’s post-1994 legal order is grounded in the constitutional principle of substantive equality. Substantive equality recognises that identical treatment in a deeply unequal society entrenches injustice rather than corrects it. Accordingly, the Constitution explicitly permits—and in certain contexts requires—measures to advance groups disadvantaged by past discrimination. These measures are remedial, not punitive, and they operate across intersecting identities rather than targeting any single group.

A closer reading of employment equity and governance legislation confirms this. Organisations are required to identify under-representation and develop corrective plans across categories including women and persons with disabilities, alongside population groups historically excluded from opportunity. No law mandates the dismissal of white South Africans, prohibits white ownership, or bars white participation in leadership. The objective is institutional inclusion, not racial displacement.

It is also essential to clarify a scientific point frequently ignored in public debate: skin colour is a polymorphism, not a biological race. Modern genetics rejects racial typologies as scientifically invalid. South African law does not rely on biological race; it uses historically defined population categories because apartheid itself enforced discrimination through those classifications. Legal redress cannot dismantle material inequality without referencing the mechanisms that produced it. This is pragmatic remediation, not racial essentialism.

All such measures are subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Bill of Rights protects all South Africans, including white citizens, from unfair discrimination. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that remedial policies must be rational, proportionate, and directed toward achieving equality. Any measure failing these tests is unconstitutional. This framework forecloses the possibility of demographic revenge or state-sanctioned persecution.

The narrative that white South Africans are victims of systemic discrimination relies on abstraction rather than evidence. It ignores the continuing concentration of land, capital, and institutional authority. It collapses complex equality law into grievance rhetoric. Most importantly, it mistakes loss of monopoly for loss of rights.

Equality laws are not instruments of racial hostility. They are tools for aligning opportunity with demographic reality and constitutional justice. To describe them as “race laws” is not merely inaccurate—it is a distortion that obscures both South Africa’s legal safeguards and the empirical distribution of power that still defines the country today.

09/01/2026

Do you envy the U.S.’s democratic system in its current form today?

😂
09/01/2026

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Nigeria’s NSCDC seeking to recruit 30,000 to meet demand from VIPs.
07/01/2026

Nigeria’s NSCDC seeking to recruit 30,000 to meet demand from VIPs.

The myth arrives dressed in confidence: universities began in Greece, or perhaps in Baghdad—white marble debates or Abba...
04/01/2026

The myth arrives dressed in confidence: universities began in Greece, or perhaps in Baghdad—white marble debates or Abbasid domes, pick your aesthetic 🏛️. Say it fast enough and it sounds settled. Then history pauses, exhales, and the sand shifts—shhh 🧭. Because long before Athens systematised philosophy or Baghdad curated translations, institutional learning was already operating along the Nile—disciplined, documented, staffed, and audited. The myth survives not because evidence is thin, but because it’s inconvenient.

Begin with the Greek sources people like to cite—then actually read them. In Timaeus 📜, Plato records Egyptian priests at Sais correcting Solon—the Solon of Athenian law—by pointing to written records stretching back thousands of years 🤯. This is not a flattering anecdote; it’s an admission. Correction requires archives. Archives require institutions. Institutions require continuity. That chain already existed south of the Mediterranean.

Those institutions had names and rooms. Egyptian temple complexes—Sais, Heliopolis, Karnak—contained the Per Ankh (House of Life) 🧠: organised centres for training scribes, physicians, administrators, and priests through long apprenticeships using written texts. Medical papyri such as the Edwin Smith and Ebers Papyrus (c. 2600–1550 BCE) show diagnostics, case histories, pharmacology, and surgical reasoning 🧬. That’s a curriculum. Call it a “temple” if you like; functionally, it’s a medical faculty.

Law and ethics were no less institutional. Ma’at ⚖️—a codified framework governing justice, contracts, balance, and governance—was taught, interpreted, and enforced by trained officials. Geometry was systematised to re-measure land after Nile floods 📐. Astronomy tracked seasons and ritual calendars 🌌. Writing, accounting, theology, and administration were credentialed domains, transmitted across generations. Entry required training; mastery required years. That is the work universities do—even if the architecture doesn’t resemble Oxford.

Here’s the plot twist people skip 🎭. Greece didn’t invent institutional learning; it encountered it. Greek thinkers studied in Egypt and acknowledged the debt. The Academy in Athens was innovative, yes—but it emerged in a world where formalised learning complexes already existed to the south. Calling Greece the “beginning” is like calling a sequel the origin. The timeline doesn’t cooperate.

And the Greeks said so themselves—plainly. Aristotle wrote in Politics 🧭:

“Egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all these things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution existing from time immemorial. We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply defects.”
That’s not modern revisionism. That’s Aristotle acknowledging ancient Egyptian law, constitutional order, and prior discovery—and urging Greeks to build on it, not pretend it didn’t exist 🤍.

What about Baghdad? The House of Wisdom 🏆 was magnificent—translation, synthesis, systematisation at scale. But translation is civilisation at its best, not creation ex nihilo. Abbasid scholars drew on Greek, Persian, Indian—and earlier Egyptian—streams preserved and transmitted over millennia 📚. To credit Baghdad as the origin while erasing Africa is historical sleight of hand, not analysis.

Imagine if we claimed modern science began with CERN and quietly ignored Babylonian astronomy or Chinese mathematics 🙃. That’s the move here. “University” gets defined so narrowly—stone lecture halls, European degrees—that earlier institutions doing the same work under different social logics are disqualified by design. Function is replaced by familiarity. Evidence loses to branding.

So no, universities did not begin in Greece or Baghdad. Those were chapters, not the prologue. The deeper origin lies in Africa, where temples doubled as libraries, laboratories, law schools, and medical colleges thousands of years earlier 🌍. The myth collapses not with a bang, but with a polite, persistent tap, tap—until silence becomes embarrassment 🤡.

That map isn’t “animals wandering around.” It’s a moving calendar 🧭—a transboundary environmental system linking the Ser...
04/01/2026

That map isn’t “animals wandering around.” It’s a moving calendar 🧭—a transboundary environmental system linking the Serengeti ecosystem 🦓 in Tanzania and the Maasai Mara 🐃 in Kenya, month by month, like nature’s own Google Calendar (minus the awkward meeting invites). The stereotype says Africans can’t manage environments at scale, can’t plan, can’t coordinate. This image just sits there politely and replies, “Are you sure you want to say that out loud?” 😏

Here’s something many people don’t know: this migration is not just a wildlife spectacle—it’s a nutrient logistics pipeline 🤯. Scientists have shown that mass drownings during Mara River crossings feed the river ecosystem, with carcasses and especially bones acting as nutrient sources over time 🧬. In other words, it’s not only animals moving; it’s matter cycling—carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus—re-seeding life downstream with every dramatic splash! and gulp! 🐊. That’s ecosystem management by biology, not by press release. 

Now for the plot twist that humbles the “we know better” crowd 🧠: the famous “about 1.3 million wildebeest” figure—quoted everywhere from documentaries to luxury-lodge brochures—may be off. A University of Oxford-led AI satellite survey reported fewer than 600,000 wildebeest in the migration counts it produced, far below the long-standing estimate, and the scientific debate is now about what that means: real decline, different methods, or both 📡. If this were Yellowstone, the internet would be on fire; because it’s East Africa, some people don’t even notice the alarm bell. 

And humans aren’t just “nearby.” They’re part of the management reality—especially around the Ngorongoro Conservation Area 🌍, which UNESCO describes as a multiple land-use area established so wildlife and Maasai pastoralists can coexist through traditional grazing alongside conservation goals 🐄. That’s not the cartoon of “pristine wilderness vs. people.” That’s a messy, deliberate balancing act—ecology, livelihoods, and politics all in one pot, simmering, sometimes boiling 🔥. 

Even fire—the thing outsiders love to panic about—isn’t automatically “disaster” here 🔥. In savanna systems like the Serengeti–Mara, fire regimes shape habitats, and research describes fire as a key ecological driver that is also used as a land management tool, with human land-use changes altering where and when burns occur 🌾. Translation: it’s not “Africa burning therefore Africa failing.” It’s “fire is part of the system, and changing it has consequences.” Try telling that to a comment section that thinks all smoke is incompetence 🚒. 

Imagine if we assumed the Netherlands couldn’t manage water because floods exist 🌊. Imagine if we mocked California for wildfire risk and concluded Americans are incapable of land stewardship. That’s how the stereotype sounds when it treats African environmental complexity as proof of African incapacity 🙃. The Serengeti–Mara isn’t “unmanaged.” It’s actively managed across protected areas, community lands, grazing systems, tourism pressures, and climate variability—while the animals themselves respond to rainfall and grass quality like living sensors, adjusting routes with eerie precision 🛰️. 

So when someone says “Africans can’t do environmental management,” point at this map and let it do that quiet, devastating thing evidence does 🧾. It shows timing, corridors, trade-offs, and a conservation model that’s about systems—not saviour fantasies. The only truly unmanaged thing here is the stereotype itself—running wild, unchecked, and somehow still expecting to be taken seriously 🤡.

Dear Nigerians, this map in blue and white is an atrocity. A very poor over-simplification of ethnic diversity in northe...
04/01/2026

Dear Nigerians, this map in blue and white is an atrocity. A very poor over-simplification of ethnic diversity in northern Nigeria. In Kebbi alone, there are multiple ethnicities.

The population of Kebbi state, Nigeria is 5.6 million or more. The population of Kebbi state is larger than that of the country the Republic of Ireland. There are 74 countries in the world each with a smaller population than Kebbi state, Nigeria.

Not many people know there are at least 10 ethnicities in Kebbi state, Nigeria. Not many people Nigeria know that each state in Nigeria is multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual.

Who are the ethnicities of Kebbi state?

1.-The Achipa (the Achipawa people) - number about 11,000 and speak Eastern Acipa.

2.-The Dakakari - found in Niger state and Kebbi state. 130,000 - 170,000 people. They have a larger population size than the countries Saint Lucia, Samoa or Tonga. They speak C’Lela and dialects of it. They have various names and sub-branches. They used a federal system in precolonial times. Some of them lived in the majority-Dakakari areas but some lived among the Zuru federation and among other political states. No other people have a similar marriage custom to them; a man must be initiated into Golmo at the U’hola annual festival to marry. The idea is to make men are responsible before they marry; it’s like a marriage counselling process that young men must go through before marriage. A future son-in-law must work on the farm of his father-in-law for seven years. They have a strong military tradition; so strong the Hausa word for infantryman is apparently “Daakaaree”. (Hausa people please confirm!) They are brave and courageous people; which is something they are also told to be during their initiation in golmo culture. The aforementioned U’hola festival celebrates the favour of God in harvest and is also a graduation ceremony for men into becoming suitors (Yadato). Some non-Dakakari people live among them: Katsinawa (Katsinawa-Laka, Kamukawa1) - near Wasagu, Bena, and Kurmachi; the Achipawa (Achifawa, Atsipawa, etc.) - near Karissen, etc.; Kambari - Kontagora Emirate, Niger Province; with Gungawa, Yauri Emirate, Sokoto Province; and the Duka (Dukawa) - mainly at Dirin Gari and Dirin Daji, Sakaba District, Zuru, and to the Northwest of Rijau, in Kontagora; a few in the border areas of Yauri Emirate.

3.-The Dandawa - There are 300,000 of them in Nigeria and another 150,000 in Benin republic. They speak Dendi.

4.-The Fulani - see my article on the origin of the Fulani (Pulbe) people.

5.-The Hausa - see my article on the origin of the Hausa people. They were farmers in precolonial times.

6.-Kambari people - They number about 297,000. The population of Kambari people in a Nigeria is more than Barbados. They are also called the Ashingiri. They speak Tsishingini, Tsikimba and Cishingini. Some are Christians. The Kambari are spread out across region of many precolonial kingdoms - Borgu, Ilorin, Busa Emirate, Kontagora Emirate, etc. They were farmers in precolonial times. They take farming so seriously only about 3% of children are sent to school.

7.-Reshe - The Reshe live in Kebbi state and Niger state (not to be confused with Niger Republic).

8.-The Uncinda - They live in Kaduna, Kebbi, Ebonyi, Niger and Sokoto states. They speak Unchinda and Hausa as a second language.

9.-The Zarmawa - 75%-95% claim to be Muslims, 5% Christians, they have a population of about 165,000. They speak Zarma, a Nilo-Saharan language and Hausa. They are spread out across western Niger Republic, northwestern Nigeria and northeastern Burkina Faso. The Songhai people and the Zerma (Zarma) people treat each other like cousins and intermarry. Zarma is a dialect of Songhai. They farm millet, tomatoes, carrots, lettuce etc. and grow fruits (guavas, mangoes, bananas and citrus fruits). They also rear animals (chickens, and cattle). Some Zarma people also believe some of their pre-Islamic beliefs are compatible with their Muslim faith such as the existence of spirit possession, spirit worship and magic.

10.-The Zuru people. Not many people know there are between 220,000 and 280,000 Zuru people in Kebbi.

Northern Nigeria is a very diverse part of Nigeria. Often people who haven’t done any research on Nigeria think that inhabitants of Northern Nigeria are one of two ethnicities: Hausa or Fulani. In reality there are about more than 95 ethnicities in total.

If Northern Nigeria were a country, it would be the sixth largest Muslim, majority country on earth.

Within this category “Northern Nigeria” I included Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Borno and Adamawa.

I have treated the “Middle Belt” as Kwara, Niger, Kogi, Abuja, Nasarawa, and Plateau.

The population of Northern Nigeria is 79.1 million. The two states with the most diversity are Kaduna with 22 ethnicities and Adamawa with 39 ethnicities.

Northern Nigeria is more populous than Tanzania (which has a population of 62 million people). There are only three countries with a larger population than Northern Nigeria: Ethiopia, Egypt, and DRC.

Compared separately to the second and third most populated countries in Africa, Northern Nigeria has more ethnicities than Ethiopia and also more ethnicities than Egypt.

Adamawa, with a population of 5 million, hosts 39 ethnic groups, equivalent to the level of diversity you would find in Mali which has 40 ethnic groups. They include:

* Bachama
* Bachere
* Bamboro (Bambarawa)
* Bwatiye
* Bille
* Bina (Binawa)
* Bole (Bolewa)
* Bomboro
* Buduma
* Bura
* Daba
* Daka
* Duma (Dumawa)
* Gude
* Gwoza (Waha)
* Higi (Hig)
* Holma
* Hona
* Kilba
* Kirfi (Kirfawa)
* Koma
* Kona
* Kurdul
* Kushi
* Kuteb
* Kutin
* Mbula
* Mbum
* Memyang (Meryan)
* Michika
* Mumuye
* Mundang
* Munga (Mupang)
* Mushere
* Mwahavul (Mwaghavul)
* Mwaghavul (Mwaghavul)
* Ndoro
* Nupe
* Pire
* Qua
* Sura
* Teme
* Tikar
* Vommi
* Waja
* Wagga
* Wula
* Wurbo
* Wurkun
* Yungur

The size of each ethnicity ranges from tens of thousands to 300,000.

The information I have shared is publicly available, and it is easily verifiable; both southern and northern Nigerians need to do better than assume that country is populated by only 5 cultures.

03/01/2026

Great Debates

Did she lie?
02/01/2026

Did she lie?

How much do you know about Paid coconuts? 🥥Did you know there are documented, evidence-based cases—not rumor, not vibe, ...
02/01/2026

How much do you know about Paid coconuts? 🥥

Did you know there are documented, evidence-based cases—not rumor, not vibe, not retroactive slander—of individuals whose roles in civil-rights or liberation movements were later proven to involve payment, informant status, or direct collaboration with state repression 📂? Each case below is grounded in released files, court records, or official inquiries 🧾. Where evidence is partial, that limit is stated plainly.

When the files finally spoke: William O’Neal 🤯
O’Neal infiltrated the Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party and rose to become head of security for Fred Hampton ✊🏾. FBI records—and O’Neal’s own later admission—confirm he was a paid FBI informant, receiving cash and material rewards 💵. He supplied the floor plan of Hampton’s apartment 🗺️ and drugged Hampton the night before the 1969 police raid that killed him 💔. This is not disputed history. It is established by the Cook County inquest, the civil settlement (Hampton v. Hanrahan), and the Church Committee’s exposure of COINTELPRO 🔍. O’Neal later said he felt like “Judas.” The analogy stuck because the money trail existed 🥥.

A movement hollowed from the inside: Gary Thomas Rowe ⚠️
Rowe was simultaneously a Klansman and an FBI informant during the height of the Southern civil-rights struggle. DOJ files confirm he was paid and protected 🧷 while embedded in white-supremacist networks that targeted activists 🚨. Evidence later placed Rowe at violent attacks, including the 1963 Birmingham church bombing aftermath and assaults on Freedom Riders 🚌. His case shows a darker variant of the “paid Judas” problem: informants whose handlers tolerated or obscured violence because the intelligence pipeline mattered more than justice ⚖️.

Charisma with a paycheck: Herbert Philbrick 🎭
Philbrick publicly posed as a repentant insider exposing subversion, while secretly serving as a paid FBI informant inside labor and left-wing circles 💼. Congressional testimony and FBI acknowledgments later confirmed compensation 🧑🏽‍⚖️. Though not a civil-rights leader per se, his role mattered because labor and civil-rights coalitions overlapped deeply in the 1940s–50s 🔗. Philbrick’s payments incentivized exaggeration and distrust, weakening alliances at a critical moment ⛓️. The lesson is structural: money reshapes testimony 🧠.

COINTELPRO’s quiet contractors 🕵🏾‍♂️
Beyond headline names, the FBI and local police departments paid scores of confidential informants to infiltrate civil-rights, anti-war, and Black Power groups 💸. The Church Committee documented stipends, expense reimbursements, and legal leniency as currency 📑. In many cases, informants steered groups toward internal conflict, reckless acts, or factional splits—outcomes explicitly praised in internal memos 📌. These were not accidents; they were paid incentives aligned with disruption 💥.

When “not paid” still meant purchased 🎟️
Some figures were not salaried informants yet accepted material benefits—dropped charges, immigration relief, protection from prosecution—in exchange for cooperation 🛡️. Declassified files show this gray zone repeatedly 📚. The absence of a payroll receipt does not equal innocence; inducements functioned as payment by another name 🥥. Historians are careful here because evidence varies by case—but the pattern is well attested in federal archives 🧭.

Why this keeps recurring 🔁
Movements depend on trust, proximity, and access—exactly what informant systems monetize 🧩. Once a state agency offers cash, safety, or status to a well-placed insider, it converts moral authority into leverage ⚙️. The result is not just betrayal of people; it is sabotage of collective memory, because later narratives blame movements for implosions that were, in fact, engineered 🧨.

The rule of evidence (and its limits) 🧪
Every case above rests on primary documentation: court findings, sworn testimony, or declassified files 📜. Where proof is incomplete, responsible historians stop short 🚦. That restraint matters—because naming a “paid Judas” without records repeats the very damage COINTELPRO intended: confusion over truth 🌫️.

Bottom line 🧱
Paid betrayal in civil-rights history is not a conspiracy theory; it is an archival fact 🗄️. The files are open. The names are known. The damage was real—and measurable 📊. Today, some people advocating anti-DEI practices may likewise be paid to advocate injustice and inequality—claims that demand the same standard of evidence, scrutiny, and receipts 🧾.

02/01/2026

“I have a Nigerian passport and need 35 visas to do business in Africa as an investor. A French passport doesn’t need 35 visas to visit the same African countries.” Aliko Dangote

Fela and Kalakuta Republic is a great musical play showing in VI, Lagos. Watched it and enjoyed it. If you are a Fela fa...
01/01/2026

Fela and Kalakuta Republic is a great musical play showing in VI, Lagos. Watched it and enjoyed it. If you are a Fela fan, highly recommend it.

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