Geo-Strategic Orbit

23/10/2024

America votes: Fourteen days to go before Australia knows its fate

Focusing on the upcoming November 24 election and the possibility of another Trump presidency, it is timely to reflect on the voting system in the United States of America (US) to understand just how disabling it is to the American people; and the stain on democracy it has become per se. Reflecting on this factor is to put the US’ voting system under scrutiny within the previous Trump election and subsequent administration when he became president (2016). Trump had achieved enough collegiate points/votes to become president by the time the votes had been counted and reached the middle of America—the part of the country termed the Midwest. To place this in perspective the voting population of California—equivalent to approximately the entire population of Australia—did not have their vote/s counted as America had already gained its president having reached the 270 collegiate vote requirement. So much for the liberal-democracy being for ‘all Americans.’

The atrocious undemocratic voting system of America aside, it is pertinent to delve further into milieu of what has become their brand of politics (and what will it mean for Australia). First and foremost the overt support by Nikki Hayley, herself a presidential candidate and originally one that did not support Trump, permits even the most casual observer to think she has been offered some conditions by Trump in order to back his policies; and to and for her own gain. The conditions referred to could consist of but not be limited to, an ongoing and unwavering support for Israel and in particular, the war against the Palestinians by the US would be one; a declaration of war against Iran could possibly be another; and a powerful position within the Trump administration—probably Assistant Secretary of State could come to pass. All would solidify the Jewish vote within America for the Republicans; be a statement that the US is refocusing on the Middle East and will in the future, become more overtly involved with and definitively act within the region with a greater naval and boots-on-the-ground presence; send a message to Europe and in particular NATO, that Europe should solve its own problems and it has underappreciated America for too long; and further signify only strongman tactics gain comprehensive results—which in turn one can safely argue, would offer a byproxy approval of Putin.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it should be duly noted and not be underestimated that Iran remains an arch enemy of Israel and in keeping with this factor Israel is desperate to have it removed from the power-stakes of the Middle East. Hence and due to the continual and ongoing lobbying of the Republicans to enhance Israel’s status within the Middle East there is no reason to believe Trump—in keeping with the continual arming of Israel by the US—would not act militarily toward Iran. Such an undertaking would be deemed in military parlance a ‘pre-emptive defence arrack,’ as per the Second Gulf War of the early-2000s. The aforementioned issues are but a small component of what can be expected from a Trump administration immediately; and from a Harris administration more subtly and over a longer period of time. With this in mind we can turn to Australia and its role in the four years that is about to come.

Australia has to follow the US or its economy will be threatened and AUKUS will be sunk

Where would Australia ‘land’ in all of this upcoming horror story of a Trump (or Harris) presidency? In the first instance Australia would be expected by a Trump presidency to overtly support his (and his administration’s decision) to go to war with Iran; and Australia’s prime minister will be expected to focus the Australian people on the ‘stability’ of the Middle East being paramount to our venture into yet another Middle East war—at the behest of our strongest ally. That being bad enough there will be worse to come. Should Australia hesitate, Trump will declare the Australian ambassador persona non-grata and with much fanfare, have the ambassador escorted to the airport. Trump will then tear up the AUKUS understanding/s; ask for Australia to be removed from the ‘Five Eyes’ spy-sharing arrangement; demand Australian personnel exit Pine Gap; and walk away from American-import contracts (and moreover, it is entirely feasible, Putin will follow-up on Trump as a sign of support). Australia, facing numerous forms of political and economic re**rdation will be placed in a similar position it was in the attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy on Darwin in 1942—unprepared; caught off guard; surprised; stunned; totally incapable of responding adequately from a military perspective; and bereft of ideas of what the next step will, or should be.

International politics is ever the dynamic—especially in a globalised, and increasingly digitised world—and whilst the abovementioned is only one scenario of that ‘dynamic,’ a Trump presidency will extract and squeeze any country that does not comply with his view of a reinvigorated new world order, as per the original ‘new world order’ outlined by president George H.W. Bush of the early-1990s. Though it is true Australia has been squeezed before, in the Gallipoli landings of WWI, where the Crown’s loyal subjects were slaughtered under the incompetent strategies’ of the English, a Trump administration will show no politico-mercy if Australia even moderately diverges from the US’ pathway, especially in the Middle East. Australia will be expected to absolutely conform to the next US presidency regardless of who comes to power and the simple although unpalatable truth is Australia has no forward-defence capabilities; effectively, the capability for replacement of destroyed assets does not exist as Australia has never had an industrial revolution and the small automobile building industry was dispensed with decades ago; is near-totally reliant on the US for its replacement assets and other necessary components (e.g., spare parts) and this is why Australia has no influence over and must now follow US’ foreign policy objectives; is at the behest of the US and to a lesser extent British assets in the protection of Australian sovereignty; and must support the US per se in its Middle East and/or Asian regional commitments—this is writ large in Australia’s meaningless and pitiable response to the situation in Gaza, which essentially, has the backing of US Congress.

Should Australia decide to ‘stand alone’ and become more independent in its regional attitude (e.g., step back from its focused support of the US in bringing ‘stability’ to the Middle East, it will feel the full wrath of America’s influence in the United Nations, and this will happen regardless of the president the citizens of the US will choose—those lucky enough to have their vote counted. This sorrowful state-of-affairs is in large part due to consistent Australian governments refusing to acknowledge (and if it has been acknowledged having left any sort of meaningful response far too late) that policies need to, and have needed, to be put in place so as to circumvent any adversary; and have the capabilities to back up any losses should a kinetic engagement take place. Placing this in perspective, China embarked upon its pathway of developing self-sustainability through its socialist reform policies (circa-mid 1980s), under Deng Xiaoping knowing that it could not have any focused influence globally or in the Asian region without domestic building assets programmes; and a stringent asset replacement capability. Meanwhile Australia continues to do what it has always done: buy stuff from others who actually have research and development budgets; and factories that are able to produce (and replace) complex pieces of machinery such as ships, submarines, cars, trucks, weapons. The list goes on.

And for Australia, the list is so huge it’s now an impossible reach. Build Back Better, is an excellent idea, however as much as it is better than anything the Coalition could ever have thought of, it is yet again far too late; far too limited; and does nothing to future-proof Australia from any pending threats (read: a robust and determined China stamping its authority on the region). And moreover, if the US goes down the isolationism pathway via Congress as it did in the mid-1930s and decides it’s time for Australia to ‘stand on its own two feet,’ then we are by definition and in no uncertain terms, in a world of pain.

22/02/2024

What a war with China will actually ‘look like: The Honourable Richard Marles and the nonsensical inane yet persistent, beliefs that reside in Australian ‘power’

Watching the Defence Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles be interviewed on 7:30 on Tuesday evening was painful in the extreme. Almost as painful as watching previous Coalition ministers in the Morrison era remain committed to the drivel of how strong Australia is. The honourable minister was somewhat more straightforward than the ramblings of the previous decade of Coalition defence ministers, but it was painful nonetheless. The pain for me resides in their total lack of understanding of what is going to happen if Australia actually enters into a conflict with China over either the Asia-Pacific region in the support of America; or over Taiwan as China ramps up its retrocession demands.
There is a persistent belief within the current government (as there was in the preceding governments) that Australia actually has long-term capabilities’ and that there are no strategists in the Chinese military that are not working on how to remove Australia’s already limited capabilities to those of making Australia a near-zero actor—one that is incapable of any meaningful military input into the active war situation that must come about if a ‘shooting war’ takes place.
China will in the first instance and in order to reduce Australia to that of a position of peripheral actor and one of no real importance, fire cruise missiles into the ship-building points in South Australia and Western Australia. China will then sink as many Royal Australian Navy surface vessels in a single action as possible. And this will be done for two reasons: inking three or four vessels will create pandemonium in the military; and Australian society in general. Why would a Chinese strategist not utilize all of the facilities available to its forces and especially its missile capabilities? To think that this would not happen is by any measure and by any Australian government folly in the extreme. History has shown this happened in 1942 when the Japanese Imperial Navy’s fleet-air-arm destroyed Darwin, thereby catching Australia completely off-guard; and in doing so, proving the tyranny of distance did not exist; and of it causing pandemonium in Australian society. Furthermore, the Chinese government will takes such actions because it knows and understands Australia cannot and does not have any real and meaningful capability to repair any disabled ships and any sunk will, because they are such high-profile assets, will show Chinese superiority; and not be able to be immediately replaced. More to the point and to exacerbate Australia’s defence-dilemma (which is what it will become), to think that strategists in China will not destroy any and all air-tanker refueling capability on the ground which will immediately reduce the distance and on-station capability of the Royal Australian Air Force Joint Strike Fighters, is to remain within the same ill-understood realm that it appears, many parliamentarians’ reside.
War, is just that ‘war.’ And to think that siding with America and buying American-made assets will offer Australia a level of defence greater than what the assets actually offer—which is very little—and this factor will not deter China from striking and if need be, striking hard. Australia is not Israel and does not have any ‘rusted on’ allegiance by America irregardless of what its politicians’ (whimsically) believe. The hard truth is, China comprehends Australia has not ever, and in the third decade of the twenty-first century does not have high military capabilities; and has virtually no replacement capacities. When a ship is sunk and an aircraft destroyed, they it will not be able to be replaced which is the truth of the matter. If Australia enters a war against China the life and lifestyle of Australians will immediately enter a downward spiral—akin to that of Ukraine after Russia’s invasion—all of Australia’s military capabilities will be destroyed per se and unlike Ukraine, there will be no ‘coming back.’ Ukraine has had and does still have to a certain extent an industrial revolution in place—Australia simply does not.

10/01/2024

Here is a link to my Youtube video explaining my book including a brief commentary on how by China's retrocession of Taiwan has been interrupted (and therefore, delayed) by Russia's invasion of Ukraine; and the complex dynamics of International Relations in general.

This book 📖 is a (quasi-academic, evidence-based) work written in a narrative-style which attempts to offer an explanation of war; the trajectories therein;...

07/01/2024

Here it is... finally...the book 📖 landing 🛬 on the shelves on January 5. A commentary on war, hopefully a book that will change the way in which war is 'observed.'
For instance, in the lntroduction l suggest the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor should be seen of as a revenge attack, rather than a surprise attack per se --and l offer the reasons why etc. Also, and crucially, that a war does not happen in a vacuum which is what politicians' persistently suggest, there are always signals. The coming war in the Asia- Pacific will be no different. Now to start on book 📖 number 2....

04/12/2023

Finally ... it's all done ... finished -- a little later than expected due to editing and formatting -- but it's HERE and up on the Austin Macauley website pre-orders available and then published on 5th January, 2024 What a fantastic way to start the NY

https://www.austinmacauley.com/book/brink-2036-why-there-must-be-war-asia-pacific

For those of you who are interested here is a synopsis and a bit of commentary thrown in :-)

Book Synopsis: The Brink Of 2036: Why There Must Be A War in the Asia-Pacific
An Exploration of War; Geo-strategies within the Asia-Pacific; and the Coming Age of Pax-Sino
Author: Dr Strobe Driver
This abovementioned book is a quasi-academic narration—in that commentary of others’ is footnoted—which offers a brief analysis of what war ‘is,’ what it comprises ‘of’ and the different ‘types’ of war that occur. Having gained insights about war the narrative then moves to more contemporary times and deals with the way in which a war will evolve as China – Taiwan frictions continue; and remain undiminished. The analysis deals with China’s persistent irredentism and the way in which it will become more sclerotic as the year 2049, (in which all of China must be reunited) comes ever-closer; and the retrocession of Taiwan—through force if necessary—develops into a more pivotal and urgent requirement within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The narrative is designed to engage with the ideas and notions behind what the coming ‘brink’ will demand, observe the nuances within the reality of what a war will bring, and crucially, to apply these aspects to a war that must transpire within the Asia-Pacific region. To be sure and remaining true to the aspect of a ‘type’ of war happening, the commentary acknowledges there is already a ‘type’ of war that exists between Taiwan and China and it is a ‘war of rivalry.’ This situation must indubitably therefore, evolve from its current state-of-affairs and the stalemate therein, to a full blown kinetic exchange or series of exchanges in order for China’s ambitions to be satisfied.
Hence, the book is premised on a war that must take place as China approaches the deadlock beyond the aforesaid ‘war of rivalry’ and stagnant politico-result that has formulated over time. The end therefore and the evidence-base that has been created, must assuredly be not whether a war will take place, but when. Included in the analysis is also the possibilities associated with the enormity of a war happening—in particular, will it remain regional and only include two belligerents, or will it quickly escalate into a broader regional conflict? One which draws in numerous other actors which then evokes the possibility of it evolving into a total war. To be sure, the evidence-base and the usage of 2036 as the ‘brink,’ is further stipulated and placed in context through an event beyond China’s control. The narrative argues China will not ‘move’ on Taiwan until the (future) position of the Russian Federation is known. Specifically, will Russia exit from its invasion of Ukraine weaker or stronger? It is the contention of the author that China would have claimed Taiwan pre-2030 should Russia’s incursion into Ukraine not taken place. The reality of the situation is and remains, China would have been relatively confident Russia would have been a strong bulwark against the navies of the US and Japan when the time came to positioning and manoeuvring their forces around Taiwan. As per the aforementioned, China would have had more freedom-of-movement in the politico- and military-spheres with a strong Russian navy supporting its regional placement and military distribution of assets. This is no longer the case, at least in terms of military might. China must now wait.
Nonetheless, predicting when a war will take place is and remains an inexact science. However and with this in mind, it is equally true that the CCP, due to its regional- a and global-ambitions and especially under the auspices and mantra of a unified China, cannot and will not wait for the 2036 election in Taiwan to take place—particularly if there is a persistent attitude within Taiwan’s domestic sphere for unremitting calls of and for independence. The narrative argues China is sure to ramp up its rhetoric, influence and military presence around Taiwan post-2030, which in turn will create the brink of 203. To be sure the narrative argues, China will use a confluence of factors to not let the election take place; and invoke a much more focused military response from 2030 onwards.

War and conflict never occur ‘in a vacuum,’ as there are always signallers and events that indicate and then dictate the onset of an upheaval. This has been true of relatively minor conflicts such as the Japan – Russo War of (1904 – 1905), the Vietnam War (1963 – 1975), the Afghanistan War...

08/10/2023

A small commentary on the current Israel – Palestine conflict.

The current escalation of the Israel – Palestine conflict in which Hamas has attacked Israel in air-; sea- and land-borne missions is stunning though not unusual. The root of the actions on the part of Hamas that have taken place comprise in the first instance of what is called warfare of a ;Third Kind’/ 'Third Way' and is also often referred to as warfare of a ‘Third Type.’ Nonetheless, it is not unusual for the lesser-power to adopt this approach as it usually catches the superior power completely off guard—which has indeed, happened to Israeli forces.

This happened to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the US and its allies in the 1968 Tet (New Year) Offensive during the Vietnam War (or the American War as the Vietnamese call it); and was also the type of war that the Algerians used in expelling the French occupation of Algeria; and was the type of war the Taliban and its allies waged against the USSR, the US, NATO and its allies during the numerous Afghanistan conflicts. It is one of the most successful types of warfare when used with asymmetrical warfare tactics; and is one of the most successful because of the surprise factor; enemy intelligence failures; and creates mayhem which the opposing force/s military and government has to explain to its citizens and allies.
The type of war of a Third Kind is comprises of but is not limited to (as per my research)
A war of the ‘third kind/way’ is a complex event and has a multitude of factors involved. In relation to the Vietnam War and the resistance displayed by the North, the notion of ‘third way’ warfare is eminently traceable and involved the guerrillas being ‘indistinguishable from the general population [and] engagements must be sporadic and their perpetrators unobserved and unidentifiable … The deadly game [of direct combat and psycho-political interplays] is played in every home, church, government office, school, highway, and village.’ (See: The State, War and the State of War, 36-39). The crucial issue to understand here is the war is planned through ordinary, everyday meetings and events which is largely untraceable to the superior power and is designed for maximum politico- and military-impact, although it is the politics and the changing of the narrative therein, that is the primary aim.

The result for the 1968 Tet Offensive is writ large in this explanation by Karnow:

At three o’clock in the morning on the first night of the Vietnamese New Year, nineteen NLF [National Liberation Front] commandos blasted their way through the outer walls of the American embassy in Saigon...In the early morning of January 31, NLF troops attacked almost every important American Base, every town in the city of South Vietnam. The combined force of eighty-four thousand men simultaneously moved in to five out of the six cities, thirty-six out of the forty provincial capitals, and sixty-four district capitals …. One unit penetrated the grounds of the presidential palace, four blocks to the south; another took over the government radio station and a third assaulted the Tam Son Nhut air base, breaking through the heavily guarded perimeter to blow up aircraft and engage in gun battles with American troops. In the Delta, Front forces moved into the most “secure” of the province capitals—Can Tho, My Tho, Vinh Long, Rach Gia, and Ben Tre—entrenched themselves in the poorer quarters, and drove the ARVN units to the defense of their headquarters … But it was in the First Corps, where North Vietnamese troops joined the battle, that the offensive was by far the fiercest. From a hamlet outside of Da Nang the Front troops lobbed rockets and mortar shells into the American air base, closing down the field from which most of the tactical air strikes were run … Simultaneously, other units moved in on other American bases at Chu Lai and Phu Bat ... destroying scores of American airplanes and forcing American troops to defend their positions while they overran all five of the provincial capitals. (See Vietnam” A History. 526).

And with regard to having to explain on the part of the government why and how it all happened is also, writ large in the way in which this type of happening unfolds: In 1968 it was as follows:

‘WAR HITS SAIGON,’ screamed the front-page headline of Washington’s afternoon tabloid The News. But newspaper accounts paled beside the television coverage, which that evening projected the episode in all its vivid confusion, into the living rooms of fifty million Americans. There, on color screens, dead bodies lay amid the rubble and the rattle of automatic gunfire as dazed American soldiers and civilians ran back and forth trying to flush out the assailants. (See: Why Wars Happen 22.)

Which was then followed by this politico-commentary in Congress :
[Senator McCarthy stated] "In 1963 we were told we were winning the war…in 1964, we were told the corner had been turned. In 1965, we were told the enemy was being brought to his knees. In 1966, in 1967, and now again in 1968, we hear the same hollow claims of programs and victory…Only a few months ago we were told that 65 percent of the [Vietnamese] population was secure. Now we know that not even the American embassy [in Saigon] is secure." (See: The Vietnam Experience. Nineteen Sixty-Eight. 104 – 105).

Regardless of the successes (or lack thereof) Hamas has in the current state-of-affairs, already won in many ways as the Israeli government will have a lot of explaining to do to its citizens; as the US government had to in 1968; the French before them; and many other governments when security is so woefully lapsed.

30/09/2023

My book is due ... anyday now -- the editing is what has been the problem, though it looks like it's now (somewhat) sorted ... here's hoping ...
In the meantime last week on ABC RN Conversations (with host Richard Fidler) which was about the 'new way' of dealing with Australia's defence --the Echidna effect -- I wrote to the ABC with my thoughts on the matter. See below:
To Richard Fidler.

Dear Mr Fidler,
I found your conversation with Sam Roggeveen extremely interesting and nuanced. I too have written a book on Asia-Pacific security and it is due out soon, and I however, have a much more sombre outlook for Australia should we get involved in a war with China over Taiwan (and it is further analysed within my upcoming book). If I may offer a comment regarding your comment on Australia's submarine fleet (of possibly six boats) going to war against China's 56 submarines--not including their surface fleet and their fleet-air-arm. Whilst I understand your comment of Australian submarines 'returning to base' was only a comment, Australians should be under no illusion that if a war takes place the submarine base/s will have been destroyed by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Therefore, the submarines will become stranded assets as without doubt the PLAN will also destroy any Royal Australian Navy assets that attempt to repair and/or salvage the asset. This is what turned the tide of the Atlantic war in WWII in which German submarine bases were pounded into submission by the Allies, effectively stranding German navy assets in the Atlantic and making their on-shore safety perilous in the extreme. In the WWII Battle of the Coral Sea, it was the Japanese Imperial Navy having to return one of its carriers back to Japan which significantly helped the US win this particular battle, and within this the American military then began pounding Japanese shipyards. Hence, to assume China would not immediately destroy Australian on-shore/internal/domestic assets and therefore, severely re**rd Australia's chances of counter-strike is inconceivable. And to add to Australia's woes should a war take place there is not (and never has been) an industrial revolution --including an adequate R&D budget--in Australia, that is capable of mounting any sort of meaningful response to China without outside help. If that outside help does not materialise then Australia's military will be resoundingly beaten in a very short period of time and it will not be able to be replaced immediately; or in a timely manner--this 'timing factor' is eventually what beat N**i Germany, especially in the late-1944 Ardennes Campaign/Battle of the Bulge, and is why the Allies pursued the German military to such an extreme extent. The Allies knew Germany could not replace its losses as its industrial (revolution) base had been destroyed.
China knows this about Australia and moreover, China has had time to understand the ways of modern warfare.

Thankyou for your time and regards, Strobe

05/05/2023

For all you 'China watchers' out there here is a Special Feature from the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence
for Public Policy and Good Governance. https://cpg-online.de/

The original article I wrote (with a few minor alterations) entitled: 'Russia as Invader, China as Observer: What an invasion in Europe means for China in its quest to gain Taiwan' has been added to.
]'
What I have written over and above this article is an Addendum to the commentary cm narrative and it is entitled:

The Invasion of Ukraine ‘One year on’: What ‘type’ of
warfare is taking place and are there any
ramifications for a future China – Taiwan conflict?
'
The Addendum is on page 11 and here is the link --

https://cpg-online.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Asia-in-Review-Special-Feature-June-2022.pdf

German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellencefor Public Policy and Good Governance The German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) is an academic institute and think tank as well as a provider of advisory services and facilitator. Built upon the cooperation....

16/03/2023

Australia and AUKUS

The commentary about Australia and the AUKUS project—especially with the input of former prime minister Paul Keating—is now a very hot topic within the Australian media (and public).
There are some issues that Geo-Strategic Orbit thinks should be addressed. There has been little comment of late because I have been in the final edit stages of my book which is about the coming China – Taiwan conflict. Now that I have more time (I think), I feel the need to comment.

First and foremost, the (US-made) Virginia-class submarines are designed for long patrols and within this remit, the defence of Australia. The question that begs is, why does a submarine need to undertake long journeys in order to ‘defend Australia’? Defence is usually associated with defending a mainland and therefore, all that is needed is a littoral naval capability—a close-to-shore capability. Or the defence of Australia can also be viewed through a prism of regional cm neighbourhood actions—such as cutting off the Japanese advance toward Australia via entering New Guinea, in World War Two. It does seem odd that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is tasked with the long duration capability when the Army and Air Force are not—the Army does not have any marines (which is an expeditionary force); and all of Australia’s fighter aircraft are very limited in range. And moreover, Australia does not have a fleet-air-arm (aircraft carriers) or heavy-lift capability of any real worth (suffice to acknowledge the RAN has two helicopter carriers).
The abovementioned are however, only interesting facts and the debate that has been generated through the purchase of submarines, both through the US and the UK and has been steered towards the China – Taiwan issue within the Indo-Pacific. One could also argue the debate is somewhat hinged upon the Opposition Leader’s comment, that it would be ‘inconceivable’ that Australia would not go to war with China on its quest to retrocede Taiwan, should the US’ decide to do so. And add to this a senior public servant’s comment that the ‘winds of war are blowing’ it is not too hard to imagine a war happening.

Here is a teaser: in my book the evidence-base that I use is more toward 2030 and beyond, in which China will move on Taiwan—the reasons for this are many and there are also a myriad of ‘types’ of war that can take place and I attempt to explicate (through various scenarios), the way in which a war will ‘happen.’ That is to say, a war is coming, it just depends on how ‘big’ it is. Will it remain low-intensity, or will it expand to a mid-intensity conflict which will in turn, expand beyond a regional war? All are scenarios I deal with.
Once again all of the abovementioned are of interest to anyone following the current news cycle. But, let’s assume when the war does happen Australia has its six Collins-class submarines seaworthy and also has two Virginia-class submarines. The situation that will most likely happen is China will cut-off the Taiwan Strait—the body of water that separates China and Taiwan. Hence, a ‘war’ is declared.

TROUBLESOME FACT: It won’t actually be a ‘war’ as China being a member of the United Nations Permanent Five will veto its actions against Taiwan being declared a ‘war’ (as did Britain in Malaya, the US in Vietnam and in more recent times, Russia in Ukraine).

Assume though, Australia is called upon to give aid to the US that has become involved and it is tasked with ‘defending Australia’ by engaging with China in a series of kinetic-exchanges (a ‘shooting war) because of other allies insistence. Question number one is a dyad: can the Collins-class and Virginia-class submarines ‘fit’ into the Taiwan Strait and if they can, are they manoeuvre rapidly enough to avoid China’s anti-submarine tactics? Suppose Australia circa-2030 engages with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) with all eight boats. Imagine a success rate of what in military parlance is called an ‘even-exchange’ and the RAN manages to sink eight PLAN submarines or has a greater skill-set and sinks twice this number, before the RAN boats are sunk? How many boats does the RAN have remaining after the ‘skirmishes’? How many boats does the PLAN have remaining? In order: 0 and 55. This is a reality check.

There is also other issues Australians’ should take into account when and if, it is called upon to challenge China in a series skirmishes at the behest of an ally (most probably the US).

It is widely believed that China’s anti-ship technology surpassed the US, circa-2011.

Now we turn to the emotive side of what will happen in a war. A sense of ‘exceptionalism’ (being one of the strongest actors in a region), of which Australia has gained over the years, including referral to the Asia-Pacific as ‘our patch, doesn’t actually translate into winning a war. This facet of economic- and military-elitism has been discovered by the counter-attacking and sometimes defeat of a powerful actor: the French in Algeria, the US in Vietnam, the British in Malaya, the USSR in Afghanistan, and in more contemporary time, Russia in the Ukraine, is to name only some examples.

The abovementioned are what an Australian government should consider before venturing too hastily into a conflict with China, as without taking on board the reality of the situation and its codicils of having no substantial repair, docking, replacement, salvage, return and refit capabilities for submarines or ships … the list goes on. And moreover, all of this talk of building the submarines at a location with no missile protection capabilities—the destroying of the Russian Navy’s Orsk, which was unloading in the occupied port of Berdyansk, without adequate air cover by Ukraine forces. This is a salutary reminder of the need for much more than just infrastructure.

Australia is far behind other countries and has been for decades and moreover, has (and continues) to buy inadequate equipment that is not fit-for-purpose in a twenty-first century war. With only a few submarines and the knowledge that China is well and truly ready to stamp its authority on the region, and of AUKUS not even in its infancy, any hostilities with China must end badly for Australia … extremely badly.