04/06/2024
In March of this year, IndyCar held a non-points, $1 million purse, televised-live-on-NBC event consisting of two 10-lap sprints using one set of tires at The Thermal Club circuit near Palm Springs.
Colton Herta and others, about half the 12-car field, chose not to run at full speed in heat one in order to save their Firestone tires for race two and the chance for more cash at the end.
It did not work. Or maybe it did. Alex Palau led every lap of both sprints and of the six drivers who stunk up the first race, by not really racing at all, Herta finished highest in P4.
The event was almost universally panned because the first half was embarrassingly boring. The teams and drivers who made it that way should not be blamed; they were taking a chance to win at the end based on their best guess on tire performance.
Racing teams should not have to guess or gamble on their tires.
Tire issues too often interfere with the deserved results of driver talent and engineering expertise. Especially in open wheel racing.
This is not the fault of the manufacturers. Both IndyCar and F1 have a single tire supplier that delivers what the sanctioning bodies require, e.g., soft and hard/primary and alternate tires, and intermediate/full wet tires.
Single suppliers are good. But they shouldn't use championship races as R&D or WAG sessions.
In days gone by, manufacturer competition (Hoosier vs. Goodyear in NASCAR, Goodyear vs. Firestone in IndyCar, Michelin vs. Bridgestone in F1) often led to negative outcomes.
Worst example: At the 2005 USGP, 14 of the 20 entered F1 cars, all on Michelins, returned to the pits after the formation lap, leaving the six Bridgestone-tired cars on the grid. Practice crashes had exposed how the Michelin sidewalls were flexing on the banking; they would have to be changed every 10 laps. Michael Schumacher won, it was his only win of the season, because except for the surprise problems at Indianapolis, Michelin teams had a fair-or-not advantage that season.
That race sealed the fate of F1 racing at the Brickyard. The USGP ran two more times at Indy before leaving, and the '05 drama was the impetus for the FIA mandating one tire supplier after 2010.
Lest we think the elimination of tire wars solves every problem, harken back to the 2005 NASCAR race at Charlotte. Track president Humpy Wheeler used a grinding process as a temporary asphalt fix until he could repave, creating unusually high speeds that were too fast for the Goodyear tires provided. Four racers lost their leads after tire failures, three hitting the wall. Drivers raced at about 85 percent effort, and there were a record 15 cautions, including 12 for tire-related accidents.
Then there was the 2008 Brickyard 400, where the tires disintegrated so quickly that caution periods and pit stops were required about every 10 laps. It was the first year for the new NASCAR Car of Tomorrow, which featured more downforce from a new wing on the rear deck and afront splitter. The track could not “rubber in,” as the degradation produced tire dust instead of a sticky residue. The longest run of the race was 12 laps, and the final dash to the finish was just seven.
This year, at Bristol, a comparable situation occurred for no apparent reason. In the September 2023 NASCAR race, tires lasted 120-130 laps around the concrete half-mile bullring. Six months later, the same Goodyear tires, on the same cars at the same track, became undriveable at just 47-50 laps, when they began to cord so badly there was a loss of air pressure. The race set a NASCAR short track record for lead changes at 54 with 16 different drivers running first at some point. The previous record at Bristol for lead changes was 40 in 1991. Only five cars finished on the lead lap.
At the 2024 IndyCar season-opener at St. Petersburg the cars were supposed to run new hybrid power units, but a decision was made to postpone that upgrade until after the Indy 500. Unfortunately, Firestone’s new, 2024 tires were designed for a car 30 lbs. heavier, so the mismatch meant reduced grip, making passing nearly impossible. Joseph Newgarden dominated the race, leading 92 of 100 laps from pole. It was a boring procession with far fewer passes for position than IndyCar has become famous for.
Regardless of the series, one would hope that the car/driver/chief mechanic (engineer) setup combination would be the critical element -- not the tires.
History shows how racing tires have evolved in size, shape, and materials, with each company that introduced a new-at-the-time technological breakthrough (pneumatic tires, heat resistant rubber, low profiles, radials, slicks) reaping the benefits until the rest of the industry caught up.
Today, when there are few if any more “eureka” tire performance advances waiting to be discovered, (except solving the problem of how passenger vehicle tire wear contributes over 2,000 times more particle pollution than is pumped out through the exhaust process) it would seem the race tire manufacturers and sanctioning bodies could back off from trying to push the edge of the envelope.
Series with spec tires should never make themselves subject to a bad surprise when they show up at a track.
Races are held to entertain spectators, sponsors, television audiences and online fans. Tire problems should never be the story.
Open wheel and NASCAR might take a hint from FIA World Endurance Championship racing, IMSA, Trans Am, SCCA, motorcycle racing, dirt racing et al, and remove tires from the list of parts most likely to impact a race due to some inherent manufacturing error.
Tires should be as reliable as alternators, water pumps, and radiators.
They should simply function; so the fastest drivers, on the same rubber everyone else is running, might be rewarded with a win or podium finish when the race is over.
There will always be punctures and failures from contact with a wall, loose manhole cover, low-flying bid, small animal, or another car. But races and championships should not be decided by whether or not the tire company got the compound right.
