
20/06/2025
Since 2021, Iran has restricted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector access to key sites, removed surveillance equipment, and enriched uranium to 60%, with isolated particle detections near 84%, according to IAEA reports. While weapons-grade uranium requires enrichment to around 90%, Iran's growing stockpile of 60% material shortens the time required to reach that threshold. Breakout time, the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb, shrinks as stockpiles grow. Critically, satellites cannot directly verify enrichment levels. Without inspectors on the ground, we lack certainty about the most sensitive part of the equation. Escalating without that certainty risks grave miscalculation.
Critics dismiss this as "TACO'ing"—Trump Always Chickens Out. However, history is replete with warnings about acting on partial intelligence. In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq based on claims of weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons were never found, despite extensive inspections, and the result was decades of destabilisation, human loss, and geopolitical blowback. Restraint in the face of degraded visibility is not fear. It is refusing to gamble with war. Yes, Iran’s opacity is dangerous, but opacity on one side does not justify recklessness on the other. To avoid such recklessness, the path forward lies in restoring clarity through verification.
On June 13, Israel launched a sweeping military strike targeting Iranian nuclear and military sites, including key facilities like Natanz.