KoJE Competition (2024)

24/04/2024

🇯🇵 On April 22, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, Japan's competition watchdog 公正取引委員会, closed its antitrust investigation into Google with a commitment decision under Art. 48-6 of the AMA). I was informed of this case thanks to Masako Wakui 🙂

If I understand correctly, this case focused on Google’s discontinuation of search engine and search-service-related-advertisement technologies (says, in the original text, "検索エンジン及び検索連動型広告の技術") to Yahoo Japan.

Since 2010, Yahoo Japan has heavily relied on the technologies that enable Yahoo Japan to provide search services and to connect advertisers with publishers through search-related data, like keywords, which was crucial for revenue generation. Despite its initial commitment in 2010, however, Google (perhaps unilaterally) altered the agreement (against Yahoo's will and interest) and limited ("制限") the technology's provision from 2015 to 2022.

The JFTC perceived this action as a potential breach of the Antimonopoly Act, which could constitute monopolization ("私的独占" at Art. 3 of the AMA), refusal to deal ("取引拒絶" at para 2 of the JFTC’s UTPs General Designation) or interference with competitor transactions ("競争者に対する取引妨害" at para 14 of the General Designation). As far as I understand, these actions are generally deemed as anti-competitive practices, rather than unfair practices, under the AMA, restricting (or lessening) competition in relevant markets.

I am not sure, but it appears that, if this case had proceeded, anti-competitive effects on the digital ad market and/or the market for search service, where Google and Yahoo both are active, would've been found, as Google, a monopolist, refused to offer (more precisely, limited or restricted) the seemingly very necessary technologies thereby favoring its own businesses.
* I don't mean that it's about self-preferencing or essential facility doctrine. In fact, self-favoring is the very spirit of almost all anti-competitive practices, such as tying, refusal, or predation.

Japan Fair Trade Commission, Press release, 'Approval of the Commitment Plan submitted by Google LLC(April 22, 2024)' (Apr 22, 2024) https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2024/April/240422.html

See also, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Press release, 'Yahoo Japan's Use of Technological Service Such As Search Engine Provided by Google (Tentative translation)' (Dec 2, 2010) https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2010/dec/individual-000002.html

Link to this post
https://www.facebook.com/share/QQeTgkWqzSE5SiK2/?mibextid=WC7FNe

2010/12/2

22/04/2024

Letta's report* rekindles the debate on the EU's competition policy direction, following the Siemens/Alstom case (M.8677) in 2019.
* Enrico Letta, Much More Than a Market (European Council 2022)https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf

In a report released on April 17, 2024, former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, recognizing the recent economic slowdown in the EU is due to an absence or lack of industrial policy, advocated for allowing further consolidations, particularly in sectors like electronic communications and telecoms, to facilitate significant investments. Letta also suggested that this approach would enable the emergence of supra-national and pan-European businesses capable of competing with American, Chinese, and Indian conglomerates.

Any experts in competition policy may react strongly to these proposals. As noted by Reindl, this represents a "relentless" push to dilute competition law and policy in favor of industrial considerations. It is debatable whether businesses would be more inclined to invest in developing new technologies simply by being permitted to acquire competitors. Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether the recent downturn in the EU's economy is truly due to stringent competition enforcement or whether relaxing these policies would actually stimulate economic growth.

Bethan John, 'Letta report floats telecoms consolidation, pan-European state aid mechanism' GCR (April 17, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/letta-report-floats-telecoms-consolidation-pan-european-state-aid-mechanism

However, as I delve deeper into the fundamental principles of competition law and policy, I begin to question assumptions I have long believed as true. Is a free economy still effective in the era of global competition? Is industrial policy truly ineffective and merely costly in a mature economy? Moreover, is it incorrect to assume that I, as a consumer, would benefit more from services offered by large companies rather than small ones?

Of course, it seems that Margrethe Vestager, Chief of the block's competition law enforcement and policy, her opinion is very determined. She staunchly commented in a recent conference as follows:
- "There is no evidence to suggest that more concentrated national markets would lead to better outcomes, and certainly consolidation at the national level will not lead to the creation of pan-European players," (Apr 18, 2024);
- concentration (at a national level, to my understanding) would result in “less competitive national markets and a more fragmented Single Market." (Apr 18, 2024);
- “We have nothing to suggest that a more consolidated market invests more. We have every suggestion that competition is the fundamental driver to investment.” (Feb 21, 2024);
- Vestager said that competition law does not prevent telcos from undertaking cross-border consolidation. “The reason that they don't is not because of obstacles from competition law – it is more likely that it is the burden of having to deal with different regulations,” she added. (Feb 21, 2024)

Bethan John, 'Vestager stands firm as EU report pushes for greater consolidation in telecoms markets' GCR (Apr 18, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/vestager-stands-firm-eu-report-pushes-greater-consolidation-in-telecoms-markets
Bethan John, 'Vestager dismisses national telecom consolidation as solution to improving EU connectivity' GCR (Feb 21, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/vestager-dismisses-national-telecom-consolidation-solution-improving-eu-connectivity
See also, Charley Connor, 'Vestager reframes debate on “true” European champions' GCR (Jan 10, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/vestager-reframes-debate-true-european-champions

I firmly believe that as history progresses, individual freedom should be more widely spread and robustly protected. In this context, it is essential to continually question whether the current status of competition policy is the most effective means to achieve this goal, as has been assumed. I find the EU's current approach, which is generally considered desirable, was also developed through such critical thinking. Just as the EU has historically done, every policymaker, scholar, and citizen today should persistently critique the prevailing approach. Through this critical examination, we may arrive at the same conclusions—or we might not. As of now, no one can be certain.

See also https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid02k9KciCRddkpaqhvfjZU7N1ogc4RzCJM9Lmx3mM8ZSYC1wE6opFVJt5xjjEon3mHRl (regarding 4 to 3 deal in 2022)

https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid0KjSPNmieG1XbjBk1NiEEJgsCqwosF7oQpww9CqauQHq25fpcVabawqNd4brhDwLUl (on the recent 🇩🇪 Lufthansa/ 🇮🇹 ITA deal)

Margrethe Vestager today defended the importance and integrity of the EU’s merger control regime amid renewed calls for key markets to consolidate around European champions.

18/04/2024

A quick overview of the Japanese and Indian competition laws and their practices.

Millie Ward, 'What an increase in regulatory powers could mean for competition in India and Japan' GCR (Apr 17, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/what-increase-in-regulatory-powers-could-mean-competition-in-india-and-japan

Personally, the following caught my attention, as: in Korea, an increasing number of commentators support the concurrent enforcement power.

[A regulatory body having exclusive authority over competitive enforcement carries a degree of risk: it eliminates any secondary external opinions and increases the chance of that body enjoying a monolithic position on the competitive landscape.
“If the JFTC decides to invite companies under investigation for commitment negotiations, it will notify this intention in a written letter to the companies, setting out an overview of the JFTC’s concerns.” The JFTC will then have “sole discretion” as to whether it initiates this procedure, which is a cause for concern says Mr Hirayama. ]

As two distinct economic landscapes, India and Japan are taking quite different approaches to competition regulation. A deep-dive into the GCR Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review 2024 reveals key trends from these jurisdictions, as well as a region-wide concern over the interplay between data and competit...

14/04/2024

Interesting news

🇯🇵 The attached article reports that Japan's competition authority, the JFTC 公正取引委員会, recently abolished a unit dedicated to international cartel investigations—the 'Senior Investigator for International Cartel' position and its associated division. Seemingly, this organizational change has elicited mixed interpretations and reactions from the field.

One commentator suggests that this change indicates the JFTC's shifting its focus and enforcement priority towards domestic cases. Why? Another commentator sees that there may be a “lack of drive within the JFTC to take on international cartel cases,” comparing this inward shift to the 🇰🇷 KFTC 공정거래위원회 (Korea's competition authority), which has shown increasing action against international cartels.

Meanwhile, another observation links the abolishment of the international cartel unit to an increased focus on regulating businesses that utilize freelancers and issues related to the abuse of a superior bargaining position.

I had the same impression while reading the article. Indeed, the article reports that the JFTC is seeing an increasing number of extraterritorial cases involving digital platforms, which are to be handled by the Senior Investigator for Digital Platform Operators, established in 2020. To the best of my knowledge, the ASBP (as well as other UTP provisions) is a favored tool very often employed by the JFTC in digital cases.

Charles McConnell, 'JFTC axes international cartel investigation unit' GCR (Apr 12, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/jftc-axes-international-cartel-investigation-unit

It would be very appreciated, of course, anyone who is well aware of it can share their views on what's happening in Japan :-)

Japan’s Fair Trade Commission has quietly scrapped a division dedicated to international cartel investigations.

12/04/2024

Abuse of 🌱Green Dominance. What an interesting case.

🇮🇹 Italy's competition authority Autorità Antitrust recently launched an investigation into Novamont, a producer of bioplastic materials, which became dominant in that market thanks to the government's restrictions on the use of unsustainable plastics. According to a GCR article, the authority suspects the company of engaging in exclusivity agreements with downstream players, such as food retailers, manufacturers, and distributors of plastic bags. The Italian watchdog believes that such practices have prevented the emergence of alternative and more efficient bioplastics.

For me, it was particularly interesting that the government's sustainability regulation, which banned the use of normal plastic bags, effectively carved out some parts of the plastic bag market in Italy, suddenly creating Novamont's dominance in the downsized market (narrowed down from plastic bag market to bioplastic bag market). I don't know the details of this case, but it would be even more intriguing if Novamont's exclusivity agreements had been established before the governmental restrictions—though I'm not sure if that's the case.

Alex Bagley, 'Novamont accused of leveraging green dominance to exclude rivals' GCR (Apr 10, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/novamont-accused-of-leveraging-green-dominance-exclude-rivals

Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Press release, 'A573 - Italian Competition Authority: investigation opened against Novamont for alleged abuse of dominant position' (Apr 9, 2024) https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2024/4/A573

Link to this post:
https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid02xfv57Rtofki12447w1hXpgaMXR1Ni8svDAkbYC5pP7Ekk9pc4BHVUp9Ypk8yE2TEl

Il sito ufficiale della Autorita' Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

12/04/2024

I think, whether you advocate ex-ante platform regulations or not, it's worth paying attention to the ramifications (even if they are merely alleged, not proved) of industry-wide regulations like the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Recently, Google, in its blog, released a post arguing that its compliance measures to meet the obligations required under the DMA are unexpectedly (and inevitably) harming small businesses as well as consumers.

Below is a summary of ChatGPT of the following two articles:
1) Adam Cohen, 'New competition rules come with trade-offs' (Google in Europe Blog Apr 5, 2024) https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/new-competition-rules-come-with-trade-offs/
2) Bethan John, 'Google: consider DMA’s “adverse consequences” before launching own version' GCR (Apr 8, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/google-consider-dmas-adverse-consequences-launching-own-version

---summary---
Google's arguments regarding the ramifications of DMA-style regulation are focused on several key points:

1. Negative Impact on Small Businesses and Service Providers:
Google argues that the DMA and similar regulations have led to unintended consequences that adversely affect small businesses and specific sectors such as airlines and hotels. By complying with these regulations, Google has had to modify its search features, which previously allowed businesses to connect directly with consumers. These changes have resulted in reduced visibility and direct traffic for these businesses, making it more challenging for them to reach customers without intermediaries, who often charge high fees.

2. Degradation of User Experience:
The company emphasizes that the regulatory changes have compromised the user experience by removing useful features from Google Search. For instance, in Europe, when users search for flights, they no longer see a comprehensive array of information directly in Google Search. Instead, they are more likely to encounter less reliable information from intermediaries, which may include outdated or misleading pricing.

3. Increased Market Power for Few Intermediaries:
Google notes that the DMA's implementation has inadvertently favored a small number of online travel aggregators and other intermediaries. This concentration of market power with a few entities goes against the broader goal of fostering a competitive and fair digital market environment.

4. Consumer Dissatisfaction:
The company has observed and received feedback from users expressing dissatisfaction with the changes, particularly regarding the altered functionality of Google Maps and Google Search. This feedback indicates that the modifications have made it harder for users to find useful and direct information.

5. Call for Balanced Regulation:
Google advocates for a more balanced approach to digital market regulation. It suggests that future regulations should consider the potential adverse consequences, particularly on small businesses and the broader ecosystem, before implementing stringent product mandates.

In essence, Google's stance is that while regulations like the DMA aim to foster fairness and competition in digital markets, they should also consider the broader implications, including impacts on small businesses, consumer experience, and market dynamics. Google urges that a more nuanced approach to regulation could achieve the intended benefits without the accompanying negative effects.

Countries mulling Digital Markets Act-like regulation should consider the “trade-offs” that come with such rules, namely the possible negative impact on small businesses, Google has warned.

02/04/2024

🇺🇸 As many of you know, The United States Department of Justice has recently filed a lawsuit against Apple for violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

The lawsuit includes five allegations: (1) restricting "super apps" that could reduce users' dependency on Apple; (2) forcing or steering users—who wish to enjoy cloud gaming on their devices—towards purchasing expensive iPhones by preventing developers from offering cross-platform cloud gaming apps; (3) leveraging its own messaging service to solidify its market position, for example, by coloring non-iPhone users' messages differently; (4) degrading the functionality of cross-platform smartwatches when used with the iPhone; and (5) restricting the functionality of cross-platform digital wallets on the iPhone. (there may be some errors)

Below are Hovenkamp's comments. Worth reading!

Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Consumer Welfare Will Determine the Outcome of the Apple Lawsuit' (Promarket Apr 2, 2024)
https://www.promarket.org/2024/04/02/consumer-welfare-will-determine-the-outcome-of-the-apple-lawsuit/

See also, Kendra Barnett, 'Landmark US antitrust case against Apple ‘is not a slam dunk’' The Drum (Mar 21, 2024) https://www.thedrum.com/news/2024/03/21/landmark-us-antitrust-case-against-apple-not-slam-dunk-experts-say

* I referred to Natalia Moreno Belloso's LinkedIn post to summarize allegations: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nataliamorenobelloso_the-dojs-allegations-against-apple-by-n-activity-7180684106475659265-

Link to this post: https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid027nAPj5L2uain9rSKv1nGDC6YZteNsowApauFybbht9hbXGT1bzkiPcXeuAXqWahel

At the heart of the government’s lawsuit against Apple is if the tech company’s practices of tying and refusing to deal truly enhance the performance and security of the iPhone and its ancillary services. The complaint indicates that the outcome of the case will be determined by the consumer wel...

01/04/2024

🇺🇸 For those interested in the theory of harm associated with tie-ins, or luxury goods:

Recently, in the United States, two consumers initiated a lawsuit against Hermès, the seller of Birkin bags, alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the California Cartwright Act. The lawsuit accuses Hermès of tying the purchase of Birkin bags to other luxury products such as shoes, scarves, belts, and accessories. While I have limited information on the case, it seems the plaintiffs may have argued that this practice constitutes a monopolization offense under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

To me, this case presents several intriguing questions. Firstly, which competing products are allegedly being excluded by Hermès' strategy? Could it be Chanel bags or accessories? Does Hermes hold (substantial) market power in the luxurious bag market, if it exists? Secondly, how should the enforcement of competition law be prioritized? Is it justifiable to use the law as a tool to protect consumers of luxury goods, or should enforcement resources be mostly directed toward goods of necessity (although, in this very case, the plaintiffs are private parties, not public authorities)? Thirdly, what constitutes the actual harm of tying practices? Are they considered harmful and illegal solely due to their anti-competitive nature or also because of their coercive nature, which restricts consumer choice? This is a fascinating case (at least, to me), although its viability at trial remains uncertain :)

Cavalleri v. Hermes, N.D. Cal., No. 3:24-cv-01707, 3/19/24.
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/CavallerietalvHERMSINTERNATIONALaFrenchcorporationetalDocketNo324?doc_id=X5RM8L68DEP94GOFIMPMH9O5GQD

Katie Arcieri, 'Hermes Hit With Antitrust Suit Alleging Luxury Birkin Bag Scheme Katie Arcieri' Bloomberg Law (Mar 21, 2024) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/antitrust/hermes-hit-with-antitrust-suit-alleging-luxury-birkin-bag-scheme
[“The unique desirability, incredible demand and low supply of Birkin handbags gives Defendants incredible market power,” the complaint said. “Defendants implemented a scheme to exploit this market power by requiring consumers to purchase other, ancillary products from Defendants before they will be given an opportunity to purchase a Birkin handbag. With this scheme Defendants were able to effectively increase the price of Birkin handbags and, thus, the profits that Defendants earn from Birkin handbags.”]

Jennifer Lada et al, 'It's Not a Bag, It's a Birkin: Class Action Targets Hermès with Antitrust, Unfair Trade Claims' Lexology (Mar 25, 2024) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=22851c85-cef6-40a7-98a0-2faba6dccac9
[Here, the tied-product market is the market for the other or "ancillary" Hermès products one allegedly must purchase before gaining eligibility to purchase a Birkin.]
[California's Unfair Competition Law is broader in nature, prohibiting "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent" conduct. ]

Link to this post: https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid0maSucen4Rt6fEbj64b2zauAfEorkyDWzECJGDAu9DEetAboZf8BHMXVC24wM3ihfl

Hermes International is facing an antitrust suit alleging the Parisian company illegally ties the sale of its luxury Birkin bag to the purchase of its expensive clothing and accessories.

01/04/2024

As the 🇰🇷 Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC, 공정거래위원회) plans to publish policy papers this year on cutting-edge topics such as AI, platforms, and ecosystems, my interest in the activities of the Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) of the 🇯🇵 Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC, 公正取引委員会) has deepened. Below is a statement by the Secretary General on the CPRC's past activities and achievements, including discussion papers, group study results, seminars and conferences held. I hope that the KFTC's new initiatives and efforts will follow the CPRC's successes (and mark a departure from past shortcomings..).

Statement by the Secretary General at a regular press conference (March 27, 2024) https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/about_jftc/index_3_240327.html

See also,
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/cprc/

Secretarial Office, Competition Policy Research Center, Japan Fair Trade Commission Chuo Godo Chosha Building No.6 B, 16F, 1-1-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8987, JAPAN． E-mail:cprcsec_at_jftc.go.jp (Please replace “_at_” with “@”) TEL: +81-(0)3-3581-1848 FAX: +81-(0)3-3581-1945 E...

28/03/2024

🇪🇺 EU's DMA: Non-compliance proceedings

Against,
1. Alphabet's and Apple's steering rules (under Art. 5(4) DMA)
2. Alphabet's measures to prevent self-preferencing (under Art. 6(5) DMA)
3. Apple's compliance with user choice obligations (under Art. 6(3) DMA)
4. Meta's “pay or consent” model (under Art. 5(2) DMA)

Other cases to come...
- Amazon's self-preferential treatment of its own brand on the Amazon Store, under Art 6(5), DMA
- Apple's new fee structure, under Art. 6(4) DMA

European Commission, Press release, 'Commission opens non-compliance investigations against Alphabet, Apple and Meta under the Digital Markets Act' IP/24/1689 (Mar 25, 2024) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1689

European Commission, Speech, 'Remarks by Executive-Vice President Vestager and Commissioner Breton on the opening of non-compliance investigations under the Digital Markets Act' SPEECH/24/1702 (Mar 25, 2024) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1702

Bethan John, 'DMA non-compliance probes are not “rushed”, Vestager says' GCR (Mar 25, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/dma-non-compliance-probes-are-not-rushed-vestager-says

Link to this post: https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid0kKGnDkM9sMrn5qynxgHZsTxejDHptCBhjeikU42gJa2DTjGbvtE3dmWi8Hy4cFEGl

Apple, Google and Meta are being investigated for non-compliance with the EU’s Digital Markets Act barely two weeks after the rules kicked in, but an association representing the companies says the European Commission could be jumping the gun.

28/03/2024

🇩🇪 Lufthansa/ 🇮🇹 ITA deal

Reading up on the Lunfthansa/ITA deal, recently tackled by the European Commission's SOs, was quite interesting.

What really grabbed my attention, particularly, was the political responses from Italy against the Commission's enforcement actions and the Commission's apparent disregard for them. They indeed just shrugged them off.

It looks like ITA was facing some operational issues in Italy. So, the Italian government pursued the deal through which the German airline could take 41% stake in the Italian airline. However, due to some anticompetitive concerns over short- and long-haul routes, the Commission expressed its intention to tackle the initiative. Italian PM was not too thrilled. She lambasted the Commission's move. And the Commission's reaction? Put simply, it's like 'I don't give it a s**t'. The Italian PM's speech didn't change a thing. It just showed how little influence she had over the Commission's decision-making process. With elections on the horizon, the PM and politicians didn't want to look weak anymore, so they decided to keep tight-lipped reportedly.

It remains uncertain how this drama will unfold, but the European Commission's independence is definitely a characteristic that is envied by many other competition authorities around the world. Not to mention about the KFTC 공정거래위원회

---
The Italia government last year pursued the deal but it
Francesca McClimont, 'Italian PM condemns EU “block” of Lufthansa/ITA Airways deal' GCR (Sep 11, 2023) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/italian-pm-condemns-eu-block-of-lufthansaita-airways-deal
[... "The same European Commission which asked us for years to find a solution to the ITA problem, then blocks it when we do come up with a solution," Meloni reportedly said. "So we don't really understand, and we would like an answer." ...]

Francesca McClimont, 'EU opens Phase II review into Lufthansa/ITA Airways' GCR (Jan 23, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/eu-opens-phase-ii-review-lufthansaita-airways

Francesca McClimont, 'Italian lawmakers tight-lipped on Lufthansa/ITA probe' GCR (Feb 21, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/italian-lawmakers-tight-lipped-lufthansaita-probe
[Luciano Vasques ... said the government is clearly adopting a “more cautious” approach. The Italian government will have seen following Meloni’s criticism that the commission’s antitrust arm is not easily influenced by such “evident” and “loud political pressure”, he said. ... The government will likely continue refraining from making any official or unofficial comments on the deal ahead of EU parliamentary elections, he added. “It is evident that the stringent approach has not yielded any benefits in expediting clearance,” said. “Moreover, during the election period, it is advisable not to draw public attention to the government's substantial shortcomings in dealing with EU institutions, as has been the case.”]

European Commission, Press release, 'Commission sends Statement of Objections over proposed acquisition of a stake in ITA Airways by Lufthansa' IP/24/1430 (Mar 25, 2024) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1430

Link to this post:
https://www.facebook.com/kojecompetition/posts/pfbid0KjSPNmieG1XbjBk1NiEEJgsCqwosF7oQpww9CqauQHq25fpcVabawqNd4brhDwLUl

Highlights, press releases and speeches

19/03/2024

🇰🇷 Korea's competition watchdog, the KFTC 공정거래위원회, has recently sanctioned piano seller Young Chang HDC 영창뮤직 for engaging in RPM (Resale Price Maintenance) practices. Reports indicate that Young Chang, which holds nearly 50% of the market share for digital pianos in Korea, established minimum online sale prices for its products and compelled dealers not to sell below these prices. Compliance with this standard was monitored, and dealers who violated it faced penalties, including contract termination, from Young Chang.

As statute and case law require the KFTC to demonstrate the lack of justification for RPM, whether it involves minimum or maximum RPM, it is reasonable to assume that the agency has conducted a thorough analysis of the economic impact of Young Chang's RPM practices, even though this was not detailed in the press release.

이준형, '공정위, 대리점 할인 막은 영창피아노에 '과징금 1.6억'' 서울경제 (2024. 3. 18) https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/2D6ONPK86C

공정거래위원회, 보도자료, '코로나 시기 '집콕' 취미 디지털피아노, 온라인 할인 막아 고가 유지한 업계 1위 영창 제재' (2023. 3. 18)
http://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectReportUserView.do?key=11&rpttype=2&report_data_no=10517

공정거래위원회가 국내 디지털 피아노 업계 1위 HDC영창에 대해 ‘대리점 갑질 행위’를 이유로 제재를 결정했다. 공정위는 HDC...

18/03/2024

🇰🇷🇨🇳 1. Not sure how Alibaba good is (as I've not used its platform) though, I am concerned about any criticism against foreign investment simply due to their nationality. Competition can be destructive and very painful for establishments, but it, in most cases, is good for consumers, the weakest group in the economy.

2. If Korea cares about unlevel playing fields (on the ground that the Chinese firm is backed by the government), it would be good to consider adopting the EU's Foreign-Subsidies-Regulation-like law.

Jasmine Choi, 'Alibaba May Soon Dominate All of Korea’s Shopping' Business Korea (Mar 15, 2024)

Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Express announced a consumer protection policy on March 14 that offers unconditional returns and refunds within 90 days for cr

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